Essays on Bank Risk by Cabiles, Neil Adrian
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
ECONOMIA 
 
Ciclo XXIV 
 
Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 13/A3-Scienza delle Finanze 
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: SECS-P/03-Scienza delle Finanze 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON BANK RISK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neil Adrian S. Cabiles 
 
 
 
 
Relatore : Prof. Gabriella Chiesa, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato : Prof. Giacomo Calzolari, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Giugno 2012
Acknowledgements  
 
My gratitude firstly goes to Prof. Gabriella Chiesa, Ph.D. for her invaluable 
guidance and supervision in my writing of this doctoral dissertation. Second, 
I would like to thank Prof. Giacomo Calzolari, Ph.D. and Prof. Andrea Ichino, 
Ph.D. for their efficient direction of the doctoral program that I have went 
through for the past four years. I also would like to extend my appreciation to 
all the other members of the Facoltà di Economia who have helped me in the 
process of writing this dissertation, either through their comments and 
suggestions at the PhD seminars, through the individual consultations I have 
made with them or through the courses that I have taken with them. My 
thanks also go to everyone at the Dipartimento di Scienze di Economiche, 
who have helped me with my administrative needs throughout my studies.  
 
On a more personal note, I acknowledge all my colleagues and friends at 
Bologna for the companionship as well for my friends in Manila and Cebu, 
who though faraway, have given me their moral support. I am also greatly 
indebted to my family who have been my inspiration in all my endeavours. 
Lastly, I thank my Creator whom without, all this would not have been 
possible.
 Table of Contents 
 
Overview ................................................................................................................................ ix 
 
Chapter 1. Systemic Risk in the Interbank Funding Market: Indications through 
CDS Spreads ......................................................................................................................... 15 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 16 
II. Background and Related Literature ........................................................................... 18 
A. Interbank Funding Market Exposures and Risk .................................................. 18 
B. CDS Spreads .............................................................................................................. 20 
III. Empirical Analysis ...................................................................................................... 24 
A. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................ 24 
B. Data Analysis............................................................................................................. 27 
C. Estimation Results .................................................................................................... 27 
IV. Findings and Implications ......................................................................................... 29 
V. Robustness Test ............................................................................................................. 29 
VI. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 33 
Reference List ..................................................................................................................... 33 
 
Chapter 2. Hedging Illiquidity Risk through Securitization: Evidence from Loan 
Commitments  ....................................................................................................................... 39 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 40 
II. Background .................................................................................................................... 42 
A. Securitization as an Additional Funding Source ................................................. 42 
B. Loan Commitments and Illiquidity Risk ............................................................... 44 
III. Related Literature ........................................................................................................ 46 
IV. Empirical Analysis ...................................................................................................... 48 
A. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................ 48 
B. Data Analysis............................................................................................................. 50 
C. Estimation Results .................................................................................................... 50 
V. Additional Empirical Analyses .................................................................................. 51 
A. Additional Control Variables ................................................................................. 51 
B. Periods of Market Distress....................................................................................... 54 
C. Alternative Bank Risk Measures ............................................................................ 56 
 VI. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 58 
Reference List ..................................................................................................................... 60 
Appendix: The Case of European Banks ........................................................................ 71 
 
Chapter 3. Credit Risk Management through Securitization: Effect on Loan 
Portfolio Choice .................................................................................................................... 77 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 78 
II. Background and Preliminary Analysis ...................................................................... 82 
III. Related Literature ........................................................................................................ 87 
IV. Empirical Analyses ..................................................................................................... 88 
A. Securitization and the Bank Loan Portfolio .......................................................... 88 
B. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Risk and Bank Returns ........................................ 93 
V. Further Analyses ........................................................................................................... 96 
A. Securitization and Loan Portfolio Diversification ............................................... 96 
B. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Diversification, Risk and Returns ...................... 97 
VI. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 98 
Reference List ..................................................................................................................... 99 
Appendix: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ................................................. 110 
 List of Tables 
 
Chapter 1. Systemic Risk in the Interbank Funding Market: Indications through 
CDS Spreads 
Table 1. Summary Statistics ............................................................................................. 36 
Table 2. CDS Spreads and Interbank Funding Market Exposures ............................. 37 
Table 3. CDS Spreads and Interbank Funding Market Exposures with Additional 
Control Variables ............................................................................................................... 38 
 
Chapter 2. Hedging Illiquidity Risk through Securitization: Evidence from Loan 
Commitments 
Table 1. Summary Statistics ............................................................................................. 64 
Table 2. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk with Z-score as Bank Risk Indicator .... 65 
Table 3. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk with Stock Returns Volatility as Bank 
Risk Indicator ..................................................................................................................... 67 
Table 4. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk with CDS Spreads as Bank Risk 
Indicator .............................................................................................................................. 69 
Table A1. Summary Statistics for the Case of European Banks .................................. 73 
Table A2. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk, the Case of European Banks ............. 74 
 
Chapter 3. Credit Risk Management through Securitization: Effect on Loan 
Portfolio Choice 
Table 1. Summary Statistics ........................................................................................... 101 
Table 2. Covariance Matrix of Defaults among Different Loans Classes ................ 103 
Table 3. Securitization and the Bank Loan Portfolio (Entire Period) ....................... 104 
Table 4. Securitization and the Bank Loan Portfolio (Differentiated Periods) ....... 105 
Table 5. Securitization and Loan Portfolio Risk .......................................................... 107 
Table 6. Securitization and Bank Returns .................................................................... 108 
Table 7. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Diversification, Risk and Returns .............. 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of Figures 
 
Chapter 1. Systemic Risk in the Interbank Funding Market: Indications through 
CDS Spreads 
Figure 1. Financial Contagion .......................................................................................... 18 
 
Chapter 3. Credit Risk Management through Securitization: Effect on Loan 
Portfolio Choice 
Figure 1. Share of Securitized Loans to Total Outstanding Loans  
by Loans Class (2001-2004) ............................................................................................ 102 
Figure 2. Default Rates by Loans Class (2001-2004) .................................................. 103 
 
 
 Overview 
 
The global financial turmoil that happened towards the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century has highlighted the risks faced by financial intermediaries, 
in particular, banks. Under this backdrop, this doctoral thesis presents a series 
of studies on three particular risks being borne by banks namely, Systemic 
Risk, Funding Risk, and Credit Risk.  We focus on these three risks because 
these were among the risks that surfaced primarily during the Financial Crisis 
of 2007/09. Systemic Risk became an issue of great concern, when banks and 
other financial intermediaries began collapsing one after the other, due to 
their interconnected exposures through mutual lending. Funding risk, on the 
other hand, was realized as the confusion in the financial market dried up 
funding sources. Meanwhile, the matter of Credit Risk was stressed through 
the loan defaults that the banks had to bear.  
In doing these studies, we aim to achieve two goals. First is that we intend 
to provide a discussion on how these risks may come up. Second is that we 
seek to find ways on how they may be mitigated. Hopefully, through these 
exercises, we may be able to find some steps on how to move on from the 
aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2007/09. At the same time, we also aspire 
that these works may provide a valuable contribution to the literature on 
bank risk management.    
 
In the first chapter that deals with Systemic Risk, we talk about how this risk 
arises due to interconnections among banks brought about by Interbank 
Funding Market exposures. The Interbank Funding Market is the banks’ usual 
setting to close their respective cash positions at the end of every business 
day. Banks that are cash-rich may lend in the said market, while those that are 
short on cash borrow from this market. As a bank participates in the 
Interbank Funding Market, it effectively bears the risk of its counterparty/ies. 
The counterparty/ies, in turn, may also have its own Interbank Funding 
Market exposures that link it to another set of counterparty/ies. This breeds a 
situation of Financial Contagion, as in Allen & Gale (2000) and Morris & Shin 
(2008), where a problem or a failure in one institution may affect most or all of 
the other institutions linked to it.  Thus, participation in the Interbank 
Funding Market imposes Systemic Risk to the bank that either lends in it or 
borrows from it.  
To drive our point, we empirically show that Interbank Funding Market 
Exposures is positively related to bank risk. We do this by estimating the Net 
Interbank Funding Market Exposures of Top Global Banks against the price of 
Credit Default Swap contracts (CDS Spreads) involving these banks. The 
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advantage we have in using CDS Spreads as our bank risk indicator is that 
CDS Spreads are directly quoted on the risk of the underlying debt of the CDS 
contract and that of the issuer of the underlying debt. This means that the 
CDS Spreads give a clear picture of risk and one that moves sensitively and 
therefore quickly, when there are changes in the risk profile.  
As we establish a direct relationship between Net Interbank Funding 
Market exposures and CDS Spreads (and hence, give evidence to the Systemic 
Risk implication of the Interbank Funding Market), we bring forth the issue to 
re-assess the common notion, that the Interbank Funding Market is just an 
end-of-day outlet for excess funds and/or an easy source for needed cash. 
This leads to the argument that more prudence on the part of the banks is 
necessary when coming in to the Interbank Funding Market as well as more 
diligence on the part of the regulators in monitoring this market. At the same 
time, the Systemic Risk implication of the Interbank Funding Market also 
stimulate the need for banks to advocate peer monitoring, so as to tame down 
the risks that they might impose to each other (as participants in the said 
market). Should this effort push through, it might bring the reward of a more 
stable banking system. 
Our study on the Interbank Funding Market and its Systemic Risk 
implication is one of the few empirical studies on interbank funding and its 
accompanying risks, where studies in the past have mostly been theoretical 
(e.g. Allen & Gale (2000), Morris & Shin (2008), Huang & Ratnovski (2009)). In 
addition, our usage of CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator is quite novel. So 
far, only two studies have similarly applied CDS Spreads as bank risk 
indicator, namely Yu, Fung & Tam (2006) and Völz & Wedow (2009). Our 
work joins these two studies as among the few to first exploit the information 
on risk that is possessed by CDS Spreads involving banks.   
In the second chapter, we refer to Funding Risk as Illiquidity Risk, to put 
emphasis to the problem of a cash shortage that a bank may encounter. Banks 
prevalently experience Illiquidity Risk by being in transactions that could 
involve sudden or unpredictable demands for cash. In this chapter, we 
discuss a way by which banks may be able to manage this funding risk by 
focusing on one type of illiquidity risky transaction that is Loan 
Commitments.  
Loan commitments are contractual agreements that a bank may enter with 
a client. Under this agreement, the bank is obligated to lend to its client a 
certain pre-determined amount of funds, at any point in time. Since the 
client’s funding needs may be irregular, the timing and the amount of the 
takedowns on the loan commitment cannot be anticipated. Consequently, a 
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bank with a great deal of loan commitment/s could have cash shortages or 
face Illiquidity Risk.   
Earlier literature has shown that the funding problems posed by loan 
commitments may be met by banks increasing their liquidity buffers 
(Holmström & Tirole (2000), Kashyap, Rjan & Stein (2002), Cornett, Mcnutt, 
Strahan & Tehranian (2010)).  However, this strategy may be costly in terms of 
opportunity cost, since liquid assets are in the form of low yielding securities. 
At the same time, given a positive correlation between deposit withdrawls 
and loan commimtment takedowns, liquid assets as funding buffers may only 
be able to do so much. Alternatively, transactions deposits, as a stable and 
cheap funding source, may be able to alleviate this Illiquidity Risk from loan 
commitments (Gatev, Schuermann & Strahan (2007)). The study cited makes 
this case by showing that combining deposit-taking and loan commitments 
can lower the overall risk profile of the bank.  We innovate on this result by 
turning to another cheap funding source for banks which is Securitization.   
As the bank securitizes its loans, the loans are essentially used as collateral 
to borrow funds. This creates a transformation of otherwise illiquid loans into 
cash, making Securitization a funding source. Moreover, in the Securitization 
set-up, the bank does not face a direct liability to the investors (i.e. those who 
have lent through the purchase of the securities backed by the loans).  Thus, 
the usage of Securitization as a funding vehicle does not involve capital 
charges on the bank, nor does it entail required reserves. Securitization as a 
funding facility for the bank is therefore convenient.   
Using the analytical framework of Gatev, Schuermann & Strahan (2007), 
we examine how the risk of banks based in the USA and in Europe may be 
affected by their respective loan commitment and securitization activities. 
Employing three different measures of risk, our findings show that loan 
commitments and securitization as a combined banking activity is negatively 
related to risk. Securitization then, like deposits can be used by banks to treat 
the Illiquidity Risk from loan commitments.    
While the value of this particular study may be immediately found in its 
offering of an alternative means to alleviate illiquidity or funding risk, its 
concentration on Securitization as such funding vehicle gives it further 
importance. Securitization has been noted to have fostered excessive risk 
taking and a slack in borrower screening, both of which were catalysts to the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/09 (Instefjord (2004), Wagner (2005), Güner (2006), 
Uzun & Webb (2007), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru & Vig (2008), Mian & Sufi (2008), 
Dell’Arricia, Igan & Laeven (2009), Jiang, Nelson & Vytlacil (2009), Michalak 
& Uhde (2009), Purnanandam (2009)). As a result of this association with the 
said crisis, Securitization activity has been at an all time low. Through the 
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point that Securitization may be a means to hedge against Illiquidity Risk, 
Securitization receives a redeeming factor that could revitalize its practice.  
 
Complementing the ability of securitization to ease Illiquidity Risk is its 
property to be used as credit risk management facility. In the process of 
securitizing loans, the loans are transferred from the bank to the Special 
Purpose Entity (SPE). In effect, when a bank securitizes its loans, it removes 
risk from its balance sheet or isolates itself from the said loans. In the third 
chapter, we talk about how a bank may exactly take advantage of such feature 
of securitization, in the management of its Credit Risk exposures.  
The usage of securitization to handle Credit Risk is not a new concept and 
may perhaps be one of the most known properties of and motives for 
securitization. Minton, Sanders & Strahan (2004), Pais (2005), Bannier & 
Hänsel (2007), Affinito & Tagliaferri (2010) and Panetta & Pozzolo (2010), 
have all pointed out that securitization might be used to lessen Credit Risk 
exposures, by showing that banks with more risky assets are more likely to 
securitize. For our part, we take a further step by investigating on the 
outcomes as banks securitize. To be more specific, we examine the loan 
portfolio of the bank and see how its credit risk exposures may change with 
securitization. At the same time, we also investigate how such change may 
affect the overall risks and returns that the bank will face.  
The study has led us to find that Securitization is associated with more 
Credit Risk exposures, in terms of a bigger loan portfolio and a larger 
portfolio share of risky loans. This gives the intuition that the usage of 
securitization for Credit Risk management may not be for risk removal or 
isolation, per se. Instead, securitization as a means for Credit Risk managment 
may have been employed for the freeing up of some space to take on more 
risk, that is possibly motivated by the interest of getting high returns.  This 
situation may indeed be the case, as results of our empirical analysis show 
that Securitization is, as well, positively related to overall loan portfolio risk 
and bank returns.  
Furthermore, our estimations have determined that the changes in the 
loan portfolio brought about by the usage of securitization for Credit Risk 
management, have also led to an increased diversification of the loan 
portfolio itself. Moreover, this more even distribution of the portfolio across 
different loans classes has brought the known diversification benefits of lower 
portfolio risk and less volatile returns. We take these effects to serve as 
windfall for the securitizing bank, that may temper its concerns stemming 
from its increased risk-taking through Securitization.   
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We point out in our third chapter, that Securitization as a Credit Risk 
management tool may not just be then contained on the unloading of Credit 
Risk exposures from the bank’s balance sheet. Instead, Securitization for 
Credit Risk management purposes may involve the very structure of the 
bank’s loan portfolio and its choice of assets. 
By showing that Securitization, as a tool for Credit Risk management, 
involves the creation of some space to take on more risk, and with the side-
effect of diversification, this third and last chapter makes a useful contribution 
to the topic on risk management. The findings of this study carve out an 
avenue that banks can take, should their credit risk-limits begin to inflict some 
constraint. At the same time, this chapter, like that of the second one, shows 
that securitization may still have some value. This third chapter thus also 
appeals that beyond the crisis, securitization may be a bank activity that is 
still worth pursuing.  
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 Chapter 1. Systemic Risk in the Interbank 
Funding Market: Indications through CDS 
Spreads 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Banks look to the Interbank Funding Market to close their cash positions. For 
banks with excess cash, banks lend to the Interbank Funding Market, making 
it an investment outlet. Conversely, for banks that are short on cash, the 
Interbank Funding Market serves a source of needed funds. Simple as the set-
up of the Interbank Funding Market may sound, a bank’s participation in this 
market entails exposure to Systemic Risk. That is, as a bank transacts in the 
Interbank Funding Market, it takes on the risk of its various counterparties 
that may be linked to each other through the said market. Exploiting the 
capability of CDS Spreads to price the risk of a debt and/or its issuer, we 
prove this point by establishing a link between the CDS Spreads of top global 
banks and their interbank funding market exposures.   
 
JEL Classification: G21, G12, G29 
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Interbank Funding Market, CDS Spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 | C h a p t e r  1 :  S y s t e m i c  R i s k  
 
I. Introduction 
The Interbank Funding Market is a venue for banks to close their cash 
positions at the end of the day. For cash-rich banks, it is a convenient short-
term investment outlet, while for cash-strapped banks it is a major source of 
quick funding. While the set-up of the Interbank Funding Market is simple, it 
merits some concern. This is because the Interbank Funding Market breeds an 
exposure to Systemic Risk among participating banks. That is, when a bank 
transacts with other banks, it bears the accompanying risk of its 
counterparties that may also be linked to each other through the Interbank 
Funding Market itself.   In this paper, we seek to point out this Systemic Risk 
implication from Interbank Funding Market transactions.  
Central to our analysis is the usage of the price of Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) contracts involving top global banks.  We employ the price of the CDS 
contracts of our sample banks, called CDS Spreads, as bank risk indicator. 
CDS Spreads are a reliable indicator of risk because of the nature of a CDS 
contract. A CDS contract is a financial derivative that promises to pay a 
certain amount when a credit event occurs. Thus, a CDS contract provides to 
its buyer, a form of insurance on the credit risk of a debt (called the 
underlying debt) and that of the issuer of the underlying debt.  In turn, the 
price of the contract, the CDS Spread, serves as the insurance premium which 
sets the value of the risk that the insurance protection hedges. Given this 
direct link between the CDS spread and the risk covered by the CDS contract, 
the CDS Spread may be a reliable and efficient indicator of risk.  
Looking at the CDS Spreads of 64 of the Top 100 Global Banks and their 
firm-specific information, we have found a positive link between CDS 
Spreads and Interbank Funding Market exposures. This establishes our point 
that Interbank Funding Market exposures impose Systemic Risk on banks, 
which are reflected through the increase in bank risk for every increase in 
Interbank Funding Market exposure. Our results also show that the direct 
relationship between CDS Spreads and Interbank Funding Market exposures 
is stronger among US-based banks, than Non-US-based banks. This suggests 
that Systemic Risk might be higher among US-based banks than Non-US-
based banks, which may be explained by the greater number of US-based 
banks, that creates the environment for more interbank funding market 
activity.   
In checking for the robustness of our findings, we control for other factors 
that may have an influence on CDS Spreads such as the yield curve, the 
illiquidity of the CDS contract priced by the spread, and the state of the 
economy. Adding these variables does not change our main results but 
instead strengthen it. Moreover, the significance of these variables in our 
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robustness test also provides the insight that the CDS Spreads can also be 
influenced by factors that are not directly related to the risk of the underlying 
debt and that of its issuer. This means that CDS Spreads may possess much 
more information other than just credit risk that is worth investigating in the 
future.    
By empirically studying the Systemic Risk implication of participating in 
the Interbank Funding Market, we add to the relatively few data-oriented 
studies on interbank funding.1 Indeed, there might be some need to 
empirically study the interbank funding market because of its immense 
activity in the past years. In the United States, alone, the average daily traffic 
in the Interbank Funding Market is estimated at 525,000 transactions and the 
average daily volume is at USD 2.1T (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
2007).   
More importantly, the point of our study showing the Systemic Risk 
implication of the Interbank Funding Market, provides a call for a re-
assessment of the popular view that the said market is just a vent for excess 
funds and/or a quick source of funds during cash shortages. Such 
reconsideration can lead to more prudence on the part of the banks in 
participating in the Interbank Funding Market and more diligence on the part 
of the regulators in overseeing the said market. At the same time, the 
Systemic Risk implications of being in the Interbank Funding Market, 
provides the motivation for participating banks to foster a monitoring 
mechanism among each other. The benefit, if such happens, could very well 
be a more stable banking system.   
In addition, by using CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator, we provide 
some form of novelty. CDS contracts are a relatively new financial product 
and thus the application of the information that its price, the CDS Spreads, 
may possess has not yet been very much explored. In recent studies, CDS 
Spreads have been used as risk indicators of firms but, as much as this study 
has reviewed, only two works has used it as risk indicators for banks2. There 
has also been no study yet that particularly look at the link between CDS 
Spreads as a risk indicator and Interbank Funding Market exposures as a risk 
factor.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the 
background and related literature for our study.  More specifically, Section II 
                                                 
1
 Most studies on interbank funding market participation and its risks are theoretical (i.e. Allen & Gale 
(2000), Morris & Shin (2008) and Huang & Ratnovski (2009)). A recent empirical study that touches on 
interbank funding market participation has been done by Demigruc-Kunt & Huizinga (2009) but this 
focuses on bank wholesale funding where interbank borrowing by a financial institution is just a 
component.  
2
 i.e. Völz & Wedow (2009) and Yu, Fung & Tam (2006)  
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talks about the Interbank Funding Market and its risk implications, as well as, 
Credit Default Swaps and why its price, CDS Spreads, can be a reliable and 
efficient risk indicator. Section III, on the other hand, presents our data along 
with the implementation of CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator, in detecting 
the Systemic Risk from Interbank Funding Market exposures. Section IV 
discusses our findings and its implications and Section V conducts a 
robustness test of our findings. Section VI concludes.    
 
II. Background and Related Literature 
 
A. Interbank Funding Market Exposures and Risk  
The Interbank Funding Market is an easy outlet for banks with excess cash to 
invest their surplus on every closing day (than just leaving them idle). At the 
same time, it is also considerably the most convenient source of funding for 
banks that are short on cash at the end of the day. Access to the interbank 
market is quick and easy, because negotiations can be done over the phone 
and in electronic platforms. Moreover, settlements are done through 
electronic payments systems.  On the terms of borrowing and lending, the 
tenors are usually on a very short-term basis (most are just overnight), while 
the interest rate is based on a reference rate set by the regulator or the central 
bank.  
The ease of transacting in the Interbank Funding Market has made its 
activity intense and has also made it the largest source of bank wholesale 
funding. In the US, an average of 525,000 interbank funding transactions 
happens daily, with an average total volume of USD 2.1T. In a recent study by 
Demigruc-Kunt & Huizinga (2009), it has been pointed out that more than 
half of the banks’ short-term funding nowadays comes from wholesale 
funding, of which interbank funding comprises a bulk.    
However, a downside of having Interbank Funding Market exposures is 
its risk implication through the Systemic Risk inherent in interbank funding 
transactions. Allen & Gale (2000) and Morris & Shin (2008) illustrate this issue 
of Financial Contagion, which we replicate in Figure 1 below; 
Figure 1. Financial Contagion 
Bank 1  Bank 2  
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
V 
      
Y Y X 
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Suppose that Bank 1 borrows Y amount of funds from Bank 2 in the Interbank 
Funding Market. Bank 1, in such situation, will treat the Y amount of funds as 
liabilities, while Bank 2 treats it as assets. Whether the bank is a borrower or a 
lender in the interbank funding market, it faces Systemic Risk in either 
situation. In the case where a bank is a borrower (Bank 1), suppose that Bank 
2 needs the Y amount of funds to settle its liabilities (X). This means Bank 2 
will call the Y amount of funds from Bank 1. When the said Y amount of 
funds leaves Bank 1, it can be noticed, that Bank 1’s assets (V) remain. As 
these remaining assets have resultantly become unfunded, Bank 1 faces the 
problem of illiquidity and places it in a risky credit position.  
On the case where the bank is a lender (Bank 2), consider a similar 
situation that Bank 2 will have to settle its liabilities (X) and, to do so, it calls 
the Y amount of funds it lent to Bank 1. However, suppose that Bank 1 is 
unable to settle such Y amount of funds, because it has the funds tied up to 
long-term assets (V) and it has no other funding source (just as in a situation 
of market distress, for example). Under such situation, Bank 2 also faces an 
illiquidity problem and the risk of a bank failure.   
From the above discussions we find that a bank’s exposure to the 
Interbank Funding Market is risky, because an event of one party in the 
Interbank Funding Market may affect the other. Considering that one bank 
may transact with as much banks as it can in the Interbank Funding Market, 
and that the counterparties of this bank may themselves also transact with 
each other, the mutual risk impositions described above, breeds a Systemic 
Risk exposure for every participant in the Interbank Funding Market.  
In addition, our above discussions also show that the consequence of the 
realization of the Systemic Risk in the Interbank Funding Market is that the 
participant/s in the market, face illiquidity risk and the probability of bank 
failure. Demigruc-Kunt & Huizinga (2009) gives some support to this point by 
showing a positive relationship between wholesale funding, which as pointed 
out, is hugely composed of interbank funding, and bank risk. More 
specifically, Demigruc-Kunt & Huizinga (2009) points out that as non-deposit 
funding (an indicator for wholesale funding) increases, the stock price of 
volatility of the bank (which indicates bank risk) also increases and that the 
bank’s Z-score (which indicates bank health) decreases.  
Meanwhile, a specific case that illustrates how the realization of a Systemic 
Risk from the Interbank Funding Market triggers bank illiquidity and failure 
may be found in the story of UK-based bank Northern Rock, discussed in 
Morris & Shin (2008) and Shin (2008). Prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007/09, 
Northern Rock was highly dependent on wholesale funding, especially 
interbank funding, where it borrowed funds from fellow banks and other 
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financial institutions. As the subprime crisis struck in 2007, Northern Rock’s 
wholesale funders had to recall the funds they lent to the bank in order to 
cover themselves (i.e. Systemic Risk has been realized). This brought 
Northern Rock to illiquidity problems, which eventually became 
compounded when the said withdrawals created panic among the bank’s 
retail depositors. Not long after, Northern Rock suffered insolvency, as its 
assets (which were in mortgages) were unable to produce the funds it needed 
to meet its obligations.  
To summarize, the Interbank Funding Market is a convenient investment 
outlet for cash-rich banks and a funding source for cash-strapped banks. 
Though the set-up of the interbank market is simple, we point out that 
participation in this market maybe risky because of its Systemic Risk 
implications. That is, since being in the Interbank Funding Market exposes the 
participant to the credit events of its counterparties, it runs the possibility of 
facing illiquidity problems and even insolvency (when an event takes place).  
In the following section, we discuss the instrument by which we empirically 
show this risk implication from Interbank Funding Market exposures, that is 
CDS Spreads.  
 
B. CDS Spreads 
Due to the high incidence of credit events such as bankruptcies and 
insolvencies in the past decades, financial markets players have gone out to 
find means of protection from such situations. Among the solutions found is 
the CDS Contract. A CDS contract is a financial derivative that promises its 
holder a certain amount on a credit event3. In other words, a CDS contract is a 
form of insurance for its buyer from a credit event.  
Standing as the price for such insurance is the CDS Spread, also known as, 
CDS Premium. By market convention, CDS Spreads, are expressed in basis 
points (bps) and this together with the amount of protection required (called 
the notional amount) determines the payment that the CDS contract buyer 
has to make in exchange for the insurance provided by the contract. To 
illustrate, suppose that the spread for a CDS contract on Firm A is 300bps4 
and that a buyer wishes to protect himself/herself from a default on Firm A-
debt that is worth USD10MM. In this case, the buyer will then have to make a 
                                                 
3
 In most CDS contracts, a credit event may either be or a combination of the following; a. the failure 
of the debt referred to in the CDS contract (called the underlying debt) to make a principal or an 
interest payment; b. the bankruptcy of the firm/s (called the reference entity/entities in the CDS 
contract) that issued the underlying debt and; c. a restructuring of the underlying debt.  
4
 A CDS Spread of 300bps is quoted as 3.00 in financial markets. 
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payment of USD 300,000 annually5 to enjoy the protection of the CDS 
contract6.  
It is clear in this set-up of the CDS contract that the CDS spread essentially 
prices the risk, that the contract-seller takes for protecting the buyer from the 
credit event. Longstaff, Mithal & Neis (2003) points this out empirically by 
showing that CDS Spreads precisely reflect the credit risk of the debt that the 
CDS contract covers or the underlying debt. As such, CDS Spreads may then 
be considered as a variable that possesses information on the risk of the 
underlying debt as well as its issuer, which also implies that CDS Spreads can 
be used as indicator of the risk on such debt and that of its issuer.  
Supporting the point above are the numerous studies that establish the 
strong relationship between CDS Spreads and the credit ratings of the 
underlying debt and the issuer of such debt. The earliest of these studies is 
Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko & Huang (2002), which points out that a credit 
rating has substantial economic impact on the CDS spread, especially when 
the CDS contract is insuring sovereign debt7. In Longstaff, et.al. (2003), the 
link between credit ratings and CDS Spreads is pointed out more precisely, 
where a poorer credit rating on the underlying debt (and/or its issuer) and 
therefore, higher risk, is associated with a wider CDS spread8.  Longstaff, 
et.al. (2003) cites a case that after the downgrade of a firm from A to BB-
rating, the CDS spread on the debt issued by the same firm widened from 60 
to 110bps. Moreover, Longstaff, et.al. (2003) has observed that there is a wide 
gap between the CDS Spreads that involve top rated firms and those that 
involve low rated firms.  For example, the study points out that the debt of 
the firm in their sample with the highest rating of AAA has a CDS spread of 
15bps, while the debt of the lowest rated firm with a BB-rating has a spread of 
1300bps. Concurring with these points, Houweling & Vorst (2005) has found 
that CDS Spreads monotonously decrease with credit quality (i.e. higher 
credit rating categories). Likewise, Fabozzi, Cheng & Chen (2006) has 
observed that low-credit rated firms are involved in CDS contracts with wider 
spreads than better credit-rated ones.   
Meanwhile, Hull, Predescu & White (2004) has found that CDS Spreads 
widen when the issuer of the underlying debt is under review for a 
                                                 
5
 The payments are usually paid by instalments that are executed quarterly.   
6
 The prevalent length or coverage period of CDS contracts is 5 years.  
7
 Specifically, CDS contracts that protect the default of sovereign debt/s are called Sovereign Default 
Swaps.      
8
 Note that when a CDS spread is wider, the CDS contract receives more payment in providing 
protection. This implies that a higher or wider CDS spread must mean that the underlying debt and/or 
its issuer is riskier or of poorer credit quality.    
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downgrade. Moreover, the widening of the CDS Spreads has also been seen to 
continue all the way to the announcement of the downgrade. In Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2004), this point is enriched where it has been found that a rise 
or widening of CDS Spreads happens whenever the issuer of the underlying 
debt of the CDS contract is downgraded and the exact opposite happens 
when the said issuer is upgraded. Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) estimates that 
by the time a ratings downgrade is announced, CDS Spreads involving the 
downgraded debt issuer would have widened by an average of 68%, while 
CDS Spreads would have narrowed by 62% when a ratings upgrade is put 
into effect9.  
Along with the above studies instituting CDS Spreads as risk indicators, it 
has also been argued by numerous other studies that CDS Spreads as so, may 
be better than other market-based variables that perform the same function 
such as bonds spreads and stock prices. Since CDS Spreads are explicitly 
related to the credit risk of the underlying debt of the CDS contract (as well as 
the issuer of such debt), its detection of risk changes may then be more 
accurate (relative to the other market-based risk indicators mentioned). 
Aunon-Nerin, et. al. (2002) contends that since CDS contracts are written 
directly on a credit event, their prices (i.e. the CDS Spreads) are free from 
possible distortions by call features and other covenants, unlike bond prices. 
At the same time, Norden & Weber (2004) point out that by being concerned 
only with a credit event, CDS Spreads may not be affected by less relevant 
noises that can cause price movements, such as in the case of stock prices10.  
Further, CDS Spreads as risk indicators might also be faster in signalling 
risk changes, than the other market-based risk indicators. For the same reason 
that CDS Spreads have a direct link to the credit risk covered by the CDS 
contract, it is highly likely that it is more sensitive and thus react more quickly 
to factors that may affect such risk. Indeed Longstaff, et. al. (2003), has found 
that CDS Spreads react earlier than bond spreads by as much as a week, in 
relation to information about the credit situation of the issuer of the 
underlying debt of the CDS contract.  Similar observations have also been 
made in Zhu (2004) using data on US firms over a three-year period, as well 
as, in Blanco, Brennan & Marsh (2005), employing data from the two major 
financial hubs of New York and London. Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) has 
also found the same results, using CDS Spreads and bonds spreads involving 
EU-based firms. In, Norden & Weber (2004) it has been pointed that CDS 
                                                 
9
 The study uses the ratings of all three major ratings companies namely, Fitch, Moody’s and Standard 
& Poors (S&P).  
10
 An example of a less relevant noise may be doubts on the integrity or competence of a member in a 
firm’s senior management, which may not necessarily have a close relation to the probability of the 
firm defaulting on its debt, as well as, on its creditworthiness. 
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Spreads move 10-30 days earlier than stock prices, in anticipation of a credit 
rating review concerning the issuer of the underlying debt of the CDS 
contract.  As a new credit rating is announced, the said study has found that 
CDS Spreads anticipate a downgrade earlier than the stock prices of the issuer 
of the underlying debt of the CDS contract.  In addition, Norden & Weber 
(2004) has also shown that CDS spread movements, unlike that of stock 
prices, take into account the old rating of the said issuer, and the average of 
the new rating/s given to it by the three major ratings agencies.  
Taking in the above arguments, Völz & Wedow (2009) has employed CDS 
Spreads as risk indicator in a study investigating the relationship between 
risk and bank capital. In the said study, Völz & Wedow (2009) also posit an 
additional point in support of CDS Spreads as reliable and efficient risk 
indicators, through the fact that extensive users of CDS contracts are financial 
market players themselves. The study argues that since the major end-users of 
CDS contracts are financial market players who possess the skills and the 
other means to timely capture and analyze market information, then 
movements in the CDS markets, especially the spreads, must be reflective of 
the analyses of these agents. Hence, CDS Spreads may also give an easily 
accessible and collective picture of the market’s informed perception on the 
risk of the underlying debt of the CDS contract and the issuer of the debt.  In 
its findings, Völz & Wedow (2009) point out that the higher the market 
capitalization of the bank, the narrower is the CDS spread of the contract that 
insures the debt of the bank. This implies that a well-capitalized bank is of 
lesser credit risk or of better credit quality.   
In summary, a CDS spread prices a CDS contract, which provides 
protection from a credit event on an underlying debt as well as its issuer. As 
such, a CDS spread reflects the risk that the CDS contract seller takes on the 
underlying debt and on the issuer of the debt. Under this set-up the CDS 
spread may be considered as an indicator of the risk of the underlying debt as 
well as that of the issuer of this debt. In addition, since the CDS contract is 
directly engaged to the credit risk of the underlying debt and the debt issuer, 
the movement of the CDS spread may be tightly hinged on the changes of 
such credit risk.  Given this, the CDS spread, as risk indicator may be very 
precise, and thus efficient, as opposed to other market-based indicators. With 
studies supporting this point, the CDS spread has been employed as a risk 
indicator, particularly by Völz & Wedow (2009), in studying the relationship 
between bank risk and capitalization. In the following section, we take the 
same step of using CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator, while investigating 
the Systemic Risk implication of Interbank Funding Market exposures.    
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III. Empirical Analysis  
 
A. Data and Methodology  
Given that CDS contracts is a relatively new financial instrument, we consider 
the likelihood that only the debt of big banks may have CDS contracts on 
them, just as most CDS contracts are drawn on the debt of big firms. As such, 
we take a look at the Top 100 Global Banks by assets as of December 2008. We 
have found that 64 out of the 100 banks have CDS contracts written on them, 
forming our pool of sample banks. Out of the 64 banks, 31 banks are based in 
the United States, 30 are based in Europe and 3 are from Asia.   
The CDS spread quote that we use for our estimations are the mid-rates on 
Single-name 5-Year Senior CDS Spreads of the banks. Quotes on 5-Year CDS 
contracts are the most convenient to use when using CDS Spreads in 
empirical studies, because 5-Year CDS contracts are the most common ones 
being written and traded. It is also worth pointing out that under Single-name 
CDS contracts, the underlying debt are solely the bank’s debt (thus called 
Single-name)11. This makes it certain that the premiums on these Single-name 
CDS contracts is reflective of the riskiness of the debt of the bank, or in other 
words, the bank itself.  We take our quotations of the CDS Spreads from 
Datastream.  
To establish that there is a Systemic Risk implication from Interbank 
Funding Market exposures, we need to estimate our bank risk indicator 
against a measure of participation in the Interbank Funding Market. We 
denote such measure by taking the Net Interbank Funding Market Exposures 
(Net IB) of each of our sample banks. To calculate the Net IB, we take all 
interbank assets less all interbank liabilities, where both interbank assets and 
interbank liabilities are normalized against the total assets of each bank.  This 
difference is entered into the data set in absolute terms. We do so because as 
we have discussed above, the Systemic Risk implications from participating in 
the Interbank Funding Market happens in both instances, whether a bank is a 
lender or a borrower in the said market.  
For US based banks, we source our information on interbank assets and 
liabilities from the FDIC Call Reports, which are filed by the banks on every 
quarter with the Federal Reserve System. Our data ranges from 2004-200912. 
                                                 
11
 There may be some CDS contracts where the underlying debt is a pool of debt from different firms 
of the same credit profile or industry. These CDS contracts are usually used for speculation rather 
than hedging. Since the interest of our paper is to use CDS Spreads as risk indicator, CDS contracts 
whose underlying debt is a pool of debt, may not be useful to our investigation because the spreads 
on such contracts cannot purely reflect the risk of one underlying debt and its issuer. Thus, only 
spreads on Single-name CDS contracts are useful for our analysis. 
12
 We begin our sampling period at 2004 because this is the beginning period for CDS spread quotes 
from DataStream.      
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In the FDIC Call Reports, interbank assets are reflected in two entries namely 
“Cash and Balances due from Depository Institutions” (Cash and Balances) 
and “Securities purchased under agreements to resell”. Cash and Balances 
may be viewed as uncollateralized loans of the reporting bank to other 
depository institutions. These include checks and drafts in the process of 
collection and/or settlement, as well as credit card payments, interest 
payments and loan payments that are expected by the reporting bank from 
other depository institutions13. Demand deposits, loans and advances of the 
reporting institution to other banks are also part of the said account. 
“Securities purchased under agreements to resell”, meanwhile, represent 
most of the collateralized loans of the reporting bank to other depository 
institutions. The said account reflects what is commonly referred to as 
Reverse Repurchase Agreements (RRP).  
On the other hand, interbank liabilities may be found in the entries 
“Deposits of Commercial Banks and other Depository Institutions” and 
“Securities sold under agreements to repurchase”. The first entry mentioned 
reflect the uncollateralized borrowings or liabilities of a US-based bank from 
other banks, while the second entry reflect the Repurchase Agreements (RP) 
entered into by a US-based bank or its collateralized borrowings from other 
banks.  It is worth mentioning, that although banks may engage in RRPs (in 
the asset side) and RPs (in the liabilities side) with various institutions and 
even individual clients, bulk of such transactions involve fellow banks and 
other financial institutions. RRPs and RPs is a conventional vehicle that banks 
use in lending to and borrowing from each other in the Interbank Funding 
Market.      
 For Non-US based banks, we get our interbank funding market exposures 
data from Bankscope. Our data from Bankscope is on an annual basis and 
runs up to 2008. To conform with the frequency of our US-based banks data, 
we use simple linear interpolation to calculate quarterly estimates. In 
Bankscope, interbank assets are reported through the entries “Loans and 
Advances to Banks” and RRPs. “Loans and advances to Banks” is similar to 
the Cash and Balances entry in the FDIC reports, where they reflect a bank’s 
deposits, loans and items in the course of collection from other banks. 
Interbank exposure on the liabilities side, alternatively, are reported through 
the entries “Deposits from Banks” and RPs.  
As discussed, Interbank Funding Market participation may be risky for 
banks. This is because of the Systemic Risk implications of the Interbank 
Funding Market that may threaten a participating bank with illiquidity and 
                                                 
13
 This applies to the case where the other depository institutions are used by the reporting bank’s 
end clients as settlement banks.  
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insolvency, should a credit event happens on one (or some) of its 
counterparty/ies. As such, we expect that our data will show a positive 
relationship between CDS Spreads and Net Interbank Funding Market 
Exposures.   
However, it is an immediate fact that not all the risk in a bank that may be 
reflected by the CDS Spreads comes only from the Systemic Risk of Interbank 
Funding Market exposures. Thus, we control for other risk factors which we 
represent through the bank’s Leverage levels (i.e. Debt/Assets Ratio) and its 
Stock Returns Volatility14. These variables were also used in Aunon-Nerin, 
et.al. (2002), Blanco, et.al.(2005), Ericsson, Jacobs & Helfenberger (2005) and 
Tang & Yang (2006) as proxies for the firm’s risk dimensions while studying 
the potential risk information carried by CDS Spreads. We derive our sample 
banks’ Leverage levels through the same balance-sheet data sources 
mentioned above (i.e. FDIC Call Reports and Bankscope), while Stock Returns 
Volatility data are calculated based on stock price data from Datastream.  
Further, given that the structural model for CDS spread determination 
also includes the influence of market interest rates15, we also find the need to 
control for such variable. Thus, we include a market interest rate (INT) 
variable in our estimations. For US based banks we use the benchmark 3-
month US Treasury bill rate, while for European banks we use the 3-month 
Euro Repo Benchmark Rate. For our small sample of Asian banks, we employ 
the respective short-term corporate borrowing benchmark rates of their home 
economies. We take our interest rates data from Datastream.  
With our variables above, we implement panel estimations on our dataset 
under the following baseline specification:  
itjtititoit ITXIBetY εφβαα ++++= 11        (1)  
Where: itY = CDS Spread of bank i at the end of quarter t; tIBet = Net 
Interbank Funding Market Exposures of bank i at quarter t; itX = vector of 
bank i’s other risk parameters at quarter t; and tIT  = prevailing market 
interest of bank i’s home economy j at quarter t. We note that we anticipate 
the coefficient of tIBet to be positive (i.e. 01 >α ) owing to our point that 
Interbank Funding Market exposures have Systemic Risk implications that 
puts a bank in the said market in a risky position in terms of illiquidity and 
insolvency.  
                                                 
14
 We measure stock returns volatility by taking the absolute change in the quarterly stock returns of 
our sample banks. We calculate quarterly stock returns by first taking the weekly change in the stock 
prices of our sample banks and then take their quarterly average.  
15
 See Ericsson, Reneby & Wang (2006) for a discussion on the structural model of CDS Spread 
determination.  
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In executing our baseline specifications we do three sets of estimations, 
one for US based banks, another for Non-US based banks and the last 
combines the datasets of both cohorts of banks. Our basis for distinguishing 
between US based banks and Non-US based banks is to account for the 
possibility that the US based banks may constitute a different case, given that 
this cohort of banks is under one regulatory regime and economic system.   
 
B. Data Analysis 
As an initial analysis of our data before proceeding to our estimations, we 
rank our sample banks by their average Net Interbank Funding Market 
Exposures. Through this ranking, we are able to divide them into three 
groups. We consider banks in the first group, which are those in the top 67th 
percentile of the ranking, as banks with High Net IB Exposures. Banks in the 
second group, which are ranked between the 67th and 33rd percentile, are 
treated as banks with Medium Net IB Exposures. Lastly, we consider banks in 
the third group, which are at the bottom 33rd percentile, as those with Low 
Net IB Exposures. Based on these groupings, we take our summary statistics, 
which we report in Table 1.  
Our summary statistics provide a strong indication of a positive 
correlation between CDS Spreads and Net Interbank Funding Market 
Exposures. Under any case, whether it may be the case of US banks, Non-US 
banks or considering all banks, we find that the banks with High Net IB 
Exposures have markedly higher CDS Spreads, compared to those banks that 
are not exposed to the interbank funding market as much.  
On our control variables, we do not see substantial difference on Leverage 
across different bank groups. What we may note, though, is that Non-US 
banks appear to be more leveraged than US banks. On the other hand, there 
seems to be a slightly positive correlation between CDS Spreads and Stock 
Returns Volatility. We observed some instances, especially in the Non-US 
Banks Case and the All Banks Case, where banks with high CDS Spreads also 
have high Stock Returns Volatility.  
 
C. Estimation Results 
We report our estimation results in Table 2. The estimation results in Panel 1 
concern the 31 US based banks, while Panel 2 presents estimation results 
involving the Non-US based banks, specifically, the 30 European banks and 
the 3 Asian banks. The estimation results combining the data of all banks are 
reported in Panel 3. Each panel contains results under Fixed Effects (FE) and 
Random Effects (RE) estimations.  
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Both the FE and RE estimations of the US based banks case show a 
positive relationship between CDS Spreads and Net IB. The coefficients of Net 
IB are also statistically and economically significant in both estimations. This 
implies that as banks have more Interbank Funding Market exposures, they 
may be riskier. This result establishes our point that Interbank Funding 
Market exposures subject banks to Systemic Risk, that can lead to illiquidity 
problems and insolvency. Likewise, Leverage turns out to be positively and 
significantly related to CDS Spreads, implying higher risk for banks as they 
take in more debt to fund their activities. This result concurs with the findings 
in Aunon-Nerin, et.al. (2002), Ericsson, et.al. (2005) and Tang & Yang (2006), 
where higher leveraging among firms exhibit positive effects on CDS Spreads. 
The intuition behind such findings is that more debt, tend to increase the 
chances of default for a firm, consequently augmenting risks. At the same 
time, Stock Returns Volatility is also positively related to CDS Spreads. 
Indeed, firms with more unstable stock returns do tend to be more risky. 
Meanwhile, market interest rates do not seem to affect the CDS Spreads or the 
riskiness of the US based banks, as INT is not statistically significant in both 
estimations.  
In Panel 2, which deals with the Non-US based banks case, we find in both 
FE and RE estimations, the same positive effect from Net IB on CDS Spreads. 
However, this effect of Net IB on CDS Spreads is not statistically significant. 
Instead, what turns out to greatly affect the risk among Non-US banks is INT 
or the short-term market interest rates.  Given that banks’ borrowings are 
mostly on short-term debt16, higher short-term market interest rates  connotes 
higher refinancing costs for banks, that could compromise their profitability 
and liquidity and increase their default risks. On our other control variables, 
both Leverage and Stock Returns Volatility exhibit the same positive and 
significant effect on CDS Spreads.      
 Combining both the US based bank and the Non- US based bank cohorts, 
we find in Panel 3, once again, a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between CDS Spreads and Net IB. This is the case in both FE and 
RE estimations. This result points out that Interbank Funding Market 
exposures is still relevant (even in the Non-US case), despite its insignificance 
in the Panel 2 estimations. Our results in Panel 3 also show the same risk 
augmenting effect coming from Leverage and Stock Returns Volatility 
(although the former is statistically significant only under the FE estimation).  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 As pointed out in Greenbaum & Thakor (2007) and Huang & Ratnovsky (2009) 
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IV. Findings and Implications 
 
Our estimation results have satisfactorily shown that Net Interbank Funding 
Market exposures have a positive impact on CDS Spreads. Although our 
estimation results on Non-US based banks show that Net IB is statistically 
insignificant, we cannot use these results as a basis for an outright dismissal 
of the relevance of Interbank Funding Market exposures on CDS Spreads. 
This point becomes imperative given that Net IB has turned out significant, 
when all banks are considered.  What may be said then is that, even among 
Non-US banks, it is still likely that Interbank Funding Market exposures have 
an effect on CDS Spreads (albeit weak)17. In our estimations results we have 
also found that the impact of Net IB on CDS Spreads is large enough to be 
non-negligible.  These serve as convincing evidence to our contention that 
Interbank Funding Market exposures pose Systemic Risk to banks.  
Meanwhile, Leverage turning out to also positively affect risk in almost all 
estimations pushes the case, that the debt levels of banks must be given a risk 
concern.  This is an interesting point considering that most assessments on 
bank risk focus on the asset side of the bank balance sheet and less on the 
liabilities side. A further argument in favour of giving more attention to the 
liabilities side of the bank balance sheet is the large positive impact of market 
interest rates in the Non-US Case. This is because the channel by which 
market interest rates affect bank risk, in this case, is through the banks’ 
refinancing costs or on their liabilities.  Alongside Leverage, we have found 
that Stock Returns Volatility also positively affects the riskiness of our banks. 
This reaffirms the long held point that unstable stock returns is very much 
correlated with the credit profile of firms.    
 
V. Robustness Test  
 
A. Additional Control Variables  
Our above analysis has established that Interbank Funding Market exposures 
subject banks to Systemic Risk. Central to this point is our finding that Net 
Interbank Funding Market exposures have a positive impact on the CDS 
Spreads of our sample banks, which is our risk indicator. However, our usage 
of CDS Spreads as risk indicator has a limitation which comes from CDS 
Spreads being affected by other factors that are not necessarily related to the 
riskiness of the underlying debt of the CDS contract and the issuer of the debt. 
Given this, we conduct a robustness test by controlling for these other 
                                                 
17
 This matter will be discussed more in the following section.  
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variables. The additional control variables we employ in our estimations 
along with the justifications for their inclusion are as follows; 
1. Slope of the Yield Curve (Yield Curve) 
 Although the slope of yield curve does not directly figure out in the 
structural model for CDS Spreads determination, the slope of the yield curve 
has an effect on market interest rates, which, as we have pointed out is a 
major determinant in the said model. The studies that particularly recognize 
this point are Aunon-Nerin, et.al. (2002), Blanco, et.al. (2005) and Völz & 
Wedow (2009). To account for the slope of the yield curve, we include in our 
estimations the change in the difference between the yields on 10Y and 2Y 
government bonds of the respective home economies of our sample banks.  
2. Illiquidity of the CDS Contracts (CDS_BA) 
Another factor that could affect CDS Spreads that is not related to the risk 
of the underlying debt of the CDS contract and the issuer of the debt, is the 
illiquidity of the CDS contract. Illiquidity here does not mean the difficulty by 
which a CDS contract can be transformed into another asset. Rather, 
illiquidity refers here to the difficulty by which a CDS contract can be bought, 
or in other words, the absence of a seller of a CDS contract. Thus, an illiquid 
CDS contract is deemed here as one that is difficult to source or one that has 
an unanswered demand. The illiquidity of CDS contracts is mostly due to a 
still slim secondary market, because buyers tend to hold on to the CDS 
contracts to maturity (along with the underlying debt). At the same time, CDS 
contract sellers tend to be reluctant to take further positions as soon as they 
have already exhausted their risk limits in relation to underwriting CDS 
contracts. The illiquidity of CDS contracts together with the increasing 
demand for such contracts is believed to push up the prices of the contracts or 
the CDS Spreads. Among the studies confirming this point is Bongaerts, De 
Jong & Driessen (2005), which shows that CDS Spreads include a certain 
premium for the illiquidity of the contract (where this premium accrues to the 
seller of the CDS contract). Fabozzi, et.al. (2006), on the other hand, points out 
that CDS contracts with a higher number of trades, have higher CDS Spreads. 
Further, Tang & Yang (2006) has found that CDS Spreads increase for 
contracts that are quoted and frequently traded, as well as, for contracts that 
have an order imbalance and a wide discrepancy in the bid-ask quotes of the 
CDS Spreads.  
In accounting for the illiquidity of the CDS contract, we use the simplest 
proxy, which is the difference between the bid-ask quotes of the CDS Spreads 
(CDS_BA). We take the quotes from Datastream.  To note, a wider difference 
between the bid-ask quotes of the CDS spreads indicates that the CDS 
contract is illiquid and must therefore demand a higher premium, if written.  
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3. Business Climate  
When a good business climate prevails, there are lesser perceived risks, in 
general. This could lessen the financial market players’ anxiety to hedge 
against defaults, which may result to a lower demand for CDS contracts and 
cause the CDS Spreads to narrow. In Ericsson, et. al. (2005), the business 
climate was measured though the S&P 500 Index. Results of the said study 
show a significant and negative relationship between CDS Spreads and the 
said stock index, confirming the effect of the business climate on the CDS 
Spreads. In the same manner, we add the S&P 500 Index as a proxy for the 
business climate faced by the US-based banks. For Non-US based banks, the 
stock indices we use are those relevant to their home economies. For example, 
for sample banks based in Europe, we employ the FTSE Euromid Index as 
business climate indicator, while for banks based in Japan, we use the Nikkei 
500.  
4. Financial Crisis/Market Distress Variable (Crisis) 
 Periods of financial crises or market distress are especially difficult for 
banks because the money markets dry up on such episodes. With a 
heightened difficulty in finding funds, the probability of bank failures are 
high. CDS spreads on contracts involving banks during financial crises may 
then be higher than usual. 
  To account for market distress, we use a relatively new indicator 
introduced in Krishnamurthy & Jorgensen (2008).  The said study shows that 
during times of market distress, credit spreads18 tend to increase. This is due 
to the decrease in the yields on government bonds that are brought about by 
the flight of investors to safe-havens during market distress, while the yields 
among the investment-grade corporate bonds remain stable19. For the US 
based banks case, we use the spread between Long-term Moody’s Aaa 
Corporate Bond Yields and the US 10Y Treasury Yield. On the other hand for 
banks based in Europe, we use the spread between the Euro Corporate Bond 
Benchmark Rate and the 5Y German Government Bond yield20.  For the Asian 
banks case, we take the spread between the benchmark yield for Japanese 
investment-grade corporate bonds and the Japanese government 10Y bond 
yield. We note that using these indicators for market distress is a better proxy, 
                                                 
18
 Credit spreads here refer to the spread between the average yield of investment-grade corporate 
bonds over government-issued bonds with similar maturities.  
19
 It has been shown in Krishnamurthy & Jorgensen (2008) that indeed during times of market distress 
the yields on investment-grade corporate bonds are relatively unchanged and if they do so, the 
decrease is much less than the decrease in government bond yields. Thus, the credit spread widens 
due to lower government bond yields.    
20
 The Euro Corporate Bond Benchmark Rate is based on the yields of investment-grade German 
corporate bonds with maturities between 3-5 years. Thus, such benchmark rate may be comparable 
to the yield on the 5Y German Government bond.      
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than using dummy variables for the periods of financial market instabilities. 
These spreads are based on yields which are market determined and so 
allows for a more precise means of capturing the timing and extent of market 
distress than a dummy variable.  
 
B. Test Results 
Table 3 shows the estimation results with the additional control variables we 
have chosen for our robustness test. Like in the previous estimations, Panel 1 
shows the estimation results for the US based banks. Panel 2 concerns the 
Non-US based banks, and Panel 3 deals with All banks.  
In the case of US based banks, Net IB remain statistically significant and 
have a positive effect on CDS Spreads. Stock Returns Volatility and Market 
Interest Rates also remain to be statistically significant and positively related 
to CDS Spreads. Such results figure out in both the FE and RE estimations.  
On the additional control variables, the estimation results show that the CDS 
spreads are positively related to the illiquidity of the CDS contract (CDS_BA) 
and the credit spreads, while negatively related to the business climate. As 
previously discussed, the illiquidity of CDS contracts do tend to push up the 
price of CDS contracts or the CDS Spreads. At the same time, periods of 
market distress (characterized by high credit spreads), means greater risk of 
bank insolvency, which will then also increase the CDS spreads involving our 
sample banks.  In the case of the business climate, the higher stock index 
means that financial market players are more confident and expect less 
defaults, tempering the need for CDS contracts and thus its premiums. It is, 
however, worth noting that our estimation results show that the effect of the 
business climate on CDS spreads is not substantially economically significant, 
compared that of our other independent variables.  
Our results for the Non-US based banks case are similar to that of the US 
case. What needs emphasis in our results in Panel 2, however, is that Net IB is 
now statistically significant in the FE estimations as opposed to our earlier 
estimations without our additional control variables. This result supports our 
earlier contention that Interbank Funding Market exposures are still relevant 
in the Non-US based banks case.  
For the case where we put together both cohorts of banks, we still get 
parallel results. The statistically significant and positive relationship between 
CDS spreads and Interbank Funding Market exposures is sustained in both 
estimations. The same also applies for all our other explanatory variables.  
This outcome gives a strong support for our earlier findings.   
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VI. Concluding Remarks  
 
Due to the Systemic Risk innate in transacting at the Interbank Funding 
Market, exposures to such market can threaten the participating bank to 
possible illiquidity and insolvency. We have found credible evidence on this 
risk implication of Interbank Funding Market exposures on banks, through 
our findings of a positive relationship between Net Interbank Funding Market 
Exposures and CDS Spreads (which, as argued, is an efficient and reliable 
bank risk indicator). The valuable insight of these results is that, they serve as 
a call to banks to exercise caution on their participation in the Interbank 
Funding Market. Our findings stand as an appeal to banks to recognize the 
risks of the said market and not merely dismiss it as a low-risk funding source 
and/or a convenient short-term investment outlet for excess cash.  At the 
same time, our observations may also push the need for banks to advocate 
peer monitoring, so as to address the Systemic Risk brought about by the 
mutual exposures to their respective risks, while being in the Interbank 
Funding Market. A great benefit, if this is pursued, could be a safer Interbank 
Funding Market, which could even lead to a stronger banking system. On the 
part of regulation, our findings may also be a call for regulators to pay close 
attention to the Interbank Funding Market. This means that the role of the 
regulators in the said market has to go beyond the monitoring of flows and 
the setting of the market’s reference rate.    
In addition, our robustness tests, have shown that while CDS Spreads can 
sufficiently capture the risk of the underlying debt of the CDS contract and 
that of the issuer of the debt, CDS spreads may also be determined by other 
factors. These alternative factors, which have also been found as affecting 
CDS spreads in other studies, may not be necessarily related to the risk of the 
underlying debt of the CDS contract and the issuer of such debt.  These 
outcomes give us the point that CDS Spreads may possess much more 
information and not just the default or credit risk of the debt that it covers. On 
this note, much then still needs to be studied about CDS Spreads.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Net Interbank Funding Market Exposures (Net IB) 
 
Low Exposure 
(Net IB ≤ 33rd 
Percentile) 
Medium 
Exposure (33rd 
Percentile<Net 
IB ≤ 67th 
Percentile) 
High Exposure 
(67th Percentile 
≤ Net IB) 
US based Banks 
CDS Spread  70.881 63.293 145.55 
Leverage  86.631 85.843 86.530 
Stock Returns Volatility 16.098 12.869 14.282 
    Sampling Period: 2004:1-2009:3 No. of Banks in Each Group: 10 
Non-US based Banks  
CDS Spread  44.244 40.076 49.602 
Leverage  96.353 96.203 96.147 
Stock Returns Volatility 11.159 12.226 15.848 
    Sampling Period: 2004:1-2008:4 No. of Banks in Each Group: 11 
All Banks 
CDS Spread  62.231 51.216 85.866 
Leverage  89.137 91.482 92.956 
Stock Returns Volatility 13.451 12.263 15.454 
    Sampling Period: 2004:1-2008:4/2009:3 No. of Banks in Each Group: 21 
Balance sheet data for US based banks are taken from the FDIC Quarterly Call Reports 
and runs from 2004-2009:3. Balance sheet data for the Non-US based banks are taken 
from Bankscope and runs from 2004-2008. CDS Spread and Stock Returns Volatility Data 
are taken from Datastream.           
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Table 2. CDS Spreads and Interbank Funding Market Exposures 
Dependent Variable  CDS Spread 
 
1:US based Banks 2:Non-US based Banks  3:All Banks 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Independent Variables  
      Net IB  5.065*** 5.206*** 0.766 0.073 4.652*** 4.007*** 
 
(3.667) (3.848) (1.223) (0.193) (4.817) (4.442) 
Leverage  1.904* 1.681* 8.838*** 3.616*** 1.952** 0.833 
 
(1.777) (1.663) (3.879) (3.143) (2.430) (1.186) 
Stock Returns Volatility 4.344*** 4.304*** 2.060*** 2.169*** 4.001*** 4.047*** 
 
(10.935) (10.893) (14.592) (15.945) (15.253) (15.554) 
INT -5.645 -5.517 15.874*** 13.394*** -2.491 -1.573 
 
(-0.969) (-0.949) (8.638) (8.367) (-0.668) (-0.428) 
No. Of Obs 670 670 557 557 1227 1227 
No. Of Banks 31 31 33 33 64 64 
R
2
 0.370 0.370 0.505 0.505 0.381 0.381 
The dependent variable is the CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator. Net IB represents the Net Interbank 
Funding Market Exposure of each sample bank which is calculated as Interbank Assets less Interbank 
Liabilities (normalized to Total Assets and in absolute terms).  Leverage is measured as the Debt-to-
Assets Ratio of each sample bank. Stock Returns Volatility is calculated as the quarterly change in the 
stock price of each sample bank. INT is the market interest rate. Panel 1 presents the Fixed Effects 
(FE) and Random Effects (RE) estimation results using the data of US-based banks only. Panel 2 
presents the FE & RE estimation results using data of Non-US based (i.e. European and Asian) banks. 
Panel 3 presents the FE & RE estimation results using the combined data of US and Non-US banks (i.e. 
All sample banks). Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 3. CDS Spreads and Interbank Funding Market Expoures  
with Additional Control Variables 
Dependent Variable  CDS Spread           
 
1:US based Banks 2:Non-US based Banks  3:All Banks 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Independent Variables  
      Net IB  1.857*** 2.223*** 0.837** 0.139 2.107*** 1.491*** 
 
(3.133) (3.616) (2.261) (0.583) (4.873) (3.982) 
Leverage  0.694 0.415 -1.474 0.110 0.746** 0.103 
 
(1.557) (1.030) (-1.068) (0.150) (2.203) (0.385) 
Stock Returns Volatility 1.282*** 1.138*** 0.515*** 0.647*** 1.347*** 1.284*** 
 
(5.578) (4.476) (5.230) (6.771) (9.289) (8.335) 
INT  11.845*** 11.303*** 6.812*** 4.173*** 3.348* 2.081 
 
(3.381) (2.846) (4.421) (2.901) (1.910) (1.186) 
Yield Curve  -0.019 -0.018 0.004 0.005* -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 
(-0.681) (-0.569) (1.493) (1.847) (-4.558) (-4.166) 
CDS_BA  4.853*** 5.153*** 5.788*** 6.300*** 4.891*** 5.214*** 
 
(53.439) (51.156) (19.588) (24.097) (70.245) (67.785) 
Business Climate  -0.088** -0.079* -0.010*** -0.004** -0.010* -0.007 
 
(-2.326) (-1.846) (-4.271) (-2.255) (-1.775) (-1.577) 
Crisis  56.962*** 56.172*** 22.210*** 18.717*** 59.110*** 57.097*** 
 
(5.137) (4.506) (5.040) (4.323) (11.162) (10.745) 
No. Of Obs 669 669 557 557 1226 1226 
No. Of Banks 31 31 33 33 64 64 
R
2
 0.894 0.894 0.836 0.836 0.891 0.891 
The dependent variable is the CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator. Yield Curve is calculated as the 
change in the difference between the yields on 10Y and 2Y government bonds. CDS_BA is the 
difference between the Bid-Ask quote of CDS Spreads, which measures the illiquidity of the CDS 
Contract. Business Climate is measured by the Stock Market Index. The Crisis variable is measured 
through the spread between the yield of an investment-grade bond and that of a government bond of 
similar maturity. Panel 1 presents the FE and RE estimation results using the data of US based banks 
only. Panel 2 presents the FE & RE estimation results using data of Non-US based (i.e. European and 
Asian) banks. Panel 3 presents the FE & RE estimation results using the combined data of US and Non-
US banks (i.e. All sample banks). Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at 
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
 Chapter 2. Hedging Illiquidity Risk through 
Securitization: Evidence from Loan 
Commitments   
 
 
Abstract 
 
Securitization provides banks with an alternative funding facility, by 
transforming otherwise illiquid loans to cash. This happens as the loans, when 
securitized, are used to borrow funds from investors. We investigate the value of 
this funding role of securitization. In particular, we examine how securitization, 
through its provision of funding, may serve as a hedge against the illiquidity risk 
from loan commitments. Looking at quarterly data of banks based in the US and 
in Europe, we have found that securitization, as a funding facility, can mitigate 
the illiquidity risk posed by loan commitments. Given that a chief role of banks is 
to serve as liquidity providers through loan commitments, we take our results as 
a basis for considering securitization as an important bank funding activity 
(albeit its risk implications).   
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I. Introduction 
 
When a bank securitizes its loans, the pool of loans is effectively used as 
collateral or underlying assets to borrow funds. Securitization then allows the 
transformation of otherwise illiquid assets to cash. Through this arrangement, 
securitization provides a funding facility.  
This function of securitization as a funding source is considered to have been 
one of the major motivations for banks to securitize. Karaoglu (2005), Bannier & 
Hänsel (2007), Martin-Oliver & Saurina (2007) and Affinito & Tagliaferri (2010) 
point this out clearly, by showing that banks with high liquidity needs, tend to 
securitize their loans. In the same vein, Panetta & Pozzolo (2010) shows that 
banks whose asset portfolios are mainly composed of illiquid loans (and are thus 
highly susceptible to illiquidity shocks), have a high probability of securitizing.      
At the same time, many studies have also shown that securitization does 
augment bank funding. A good number of studies have found that securitization 
provides banks with additional funds, such that the banks that securitize can 
grant and/or hold more loans (Cantor & Demsetz (1993), Altunbas, Gambacorta 
& Marques-Ibanez (2007), Goderis, Marsh, Costello & Wagner (2007), Loutskina 
& Strahan (2008), Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011), Loutskina (2011)). In 
Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011) and Loutskina (2011) the importance of 
this funding provision is further stressed, where both studies show that banks 
with access to securitization1 can continue to grant and even increase their loans 
holdings, despite funding shocks. Moreover, Loutskina (2011) has found that 
securitization may lower the banks’ need to hold liquid assets as liquidity 
buffers, because of the additional funding it affords.  
In this study, we add to the discussion on securitization as a funding source 
by looking at its usage as a hedge against illiquidity risk. If securitization 
provides a funding facility for banks, then a bank’s engagement in securitization 
may temper risk concerns that arise from being in transactions that impose 
illiquidity risk. One such transaction which we focus on in this study is loan 
commitments.  
The illiquidity risk implication of loan commitments arises from the 
obligation of the bank to lend to its client at any point time. Since the client’s 
funding needs may be unpredictable, the timing and the volume of takedowns 
                                                 
1
Loutskina (2011) defines access to securitization as the “securitzability” of a bank’s bank balance sheet, 
which is determined by the size of the bank’s loan portfolio relative to the size of the securitization 
market of the bank’s home economy.   
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on the loan commitments may be unknown. Given this, a bank with a loan 
commitment takes on an illiquidity risk exposure that it has to manage.  
To go about our exercise, we apply the framework in Gatev, Schuermann & 
Strahan (2007), which studies the effect of combining deposit-taking with loan 
commitment activities on bank risk. In the said study, it has been found that 
engaging in both deposits and loan commitments lowers the risk of banks, as 
indicated by their respective implied stock returns volatilities. The study reasons 
that while loan commitments pose illiquidity risk to banks (because of the 
unpredictable takedowns from clients), transaction deposits, which is a stable 
and cheap funding source for the banks, can meet the loan commitment 
takedowns. Hence, bank risk is effectively reduced through transaction deposits 
supporting illiquidity-risky loan commitments, or what the study calls as the 
loan commitment-deposit synergy.  
Applying the above point to our objective, we look into the synergy of loan 
commitments and securitization and their effect on bank risk. Like transaction 
deposits, securitization may be considered as a stable and cheap (or even 
cheaper) funding source for banks2. Thus, we expect that its interaction with loan 
commitments might also temper the illiquidity risk coming from these loan 
commitments.  
To see this, we use quarterly data from 2001 to 2009 of over 100 US based 
banks, as well as, quarterly data from 2004-2009 of 27 banks based in Europe3. 
For risk measures, we employ three different proxies namely the Z-score, the 
Stock Returns Volatilities and the spreads on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 
contracts that involve our sample banks. Our results show an inverse 
relationship between all our risk measures and our loan commitment-
securitization synergy variable.  This gives evidence of a risk mitigating effect 
from the combination of loan commitment and securitization as banking 
activities. Specifically, our findings imply that, like the case of transaction 
deposits, securitization as a funding source, may have supported loan 
commitments, creating a hedge on the illiquidity risk from these loan 
commitments.  
By showing that securitization may mitigate the illiquidity risk embodied in 
loan commitments, our study gives a plus factor for securitization and a window 
of reconsideration for its continued practice. Through this, our study offers a 
                                                 
2
Securitization is a stable funding source for banks in the sense that it gives a bank a standby facility to get 
some cash in exchange for its loans. Securitization may also be a cheaper funding source (relative to 
deposits) for banks, since the activity is off-balance sheet and requires no reserves.    
3
 Our discussion for the case of European banks is found in the Appendix.  
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good contribution to the debate on securitization. However, we note that our 
study must not be considered as a pure advocacy of securitization.  We have also 
found that securitization, while providing an illiquidity risk hedge, still has risk 
implications in itself. These risk issues may stem from securitization misaligning 
bank incentives, such that banks, take on risk more aggressively and less 
prudently4. Thus, what we have, is a presentation of securitization as a dual-
edged sword5, where used properly it may provide some security but may be 
fatal when used carelessly6.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief 
background on securitization and loan commitments. Section III discusses the 
related literature on hedging the illiquidity risk implications of loan 
commitments. Sections IV & V present our empirical analyses. Section VI 
concludes.  
 
II. Background  
 
A. Securitization as an Additional Funding Source 
Securitization is the process of pooling assets and issuing new securities or debt 
backed by these assets and their cash flows.  Under this set-up, securitization 
allows the use of illiquid assets or loans (that would have instead stayed in the 
bank balance sheet) as collateral or underlying assets, for borrowing funds from 
investors. Hence, securitization creates an alternative funding facility for banks.  
What may make securitization a better funding source than others is that it is 
cheaper. Unlike other forms of funding that involves costly required capital and 
reserves (e.g. deposits), securitization does not entail such (Pennacchi 1988). This 
is because the securitization transaction is set up in a way, that the securitizing 
bank faces no direct liability to the securities holders and that the said investors 
have no claim on the bank’s assets.7  
There have been many studies that show that banks may have securitizated 
with the intention of obtaining its funding benefits. Karaoglu (2005) has found 
that banks with high liquidity needs, in the sense that they have a high level of 
                                                 
4
 Instefjord (2004),  Wagner (2005), Güner (2006), Uzun & Webb (2007), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru & Vig 
(2008),  Mian & Sufi (2008), Dell’Arricia, Igan & Laeven (2009), Jiang, Nelson & Vytlacil (2009), Michalak & 
Uhde (2009), Purnanandam (2009) 
5
 As described in Affinito & Tagliaferri (2010) 
6
 We discuss on the possible ways to practice securitization prudently in the Conclusion.  
7
 In securitization, the securitizing bank or asset originator sells the pool of loans to a Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE) which, in turn, serves as the issuer of the securities backed by the pool of loans. As such, in 
the event of a default, the claim of the securities lies not on the bank.   
C h a p t e r  2 :  F u n d i n g  R i s k  | 43 
 
 
 
loans relative to deposits, tend to securitize. Similarly, Affinito & Tagliaferri 
(2010) has seen that Italian banks that are already liquid, by having high deposit 
levels relative to assets, have lower probabilities of securitizing. Looking into 
Spanish banks, Martin-Oliver & Saurina (2007) has also observed that the 
primary reason for banks to securitize is liquidity issues. Specifically, banks 
whose deposits are too low to sustain their loans and banks with less access to 
the Interbank Funding Market8, tend to issue Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBS) in order to satisfy their funding requirements. Likewise, 
Bannier & Hänsel (2007) has seen that European banks that are less liquid, in 
terms of having less funds to lend out to other banks, are more likely to 
securitize through Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs)9. Meanwhile, using 
data from a wide sample of banks from 140 countries, Panetta & Pozzolo (2010) 
have pointed out that banks whose asset portfolios are highly composed of 
illiquid loans, have a higher propensity to securitze. The study explains that such 
banks might securitize more, because these banks have a higher concern of facing 
illiquidity shocks.  
At the same time, there have also been a good number of studies that give 
support to the point that securitization can increase bank funding. A set of these 
studies point out that the added funding from securitization has been manifested 
through findings that securitizing banks are able to grant and/or hold more 
loans (Cantor & Demsetz (1993), Altunbas, et.al.  (2007), Goderis, et.al. (2007), 
Loutskina & Strahan (2008), Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011), Loustkina 
(2011)). In Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011) this is further highlighted, 
where it has been found that banks that securitize heavily are able to conintue 
and increase their lending even during periods of funding shocks, such as when 
there is an increase in policy rates or when there is a crisis scenario.  Similarly, 
Loutskina (2011) has also found that banks with more securitizable balance 
sheets10 can sustain their loans activity, despite a period of contractionary 
monetary policy. In addition, the increased funding from securitization could 
                                                 
8
 Martin-Oliver & Saurina (2007) measures Interbank Funding Market access in terms of the Interbank 
Liabilities to Total Liabilities ratio, where its findings show that banks with higher Interbank 
Liabilities/Total Liabilities have a lower probability of securitizing. Given that the Interbank Funding 
Market is a convenient source for short-term funding, a bank’s low tendency to securitize when it has 
much access to the said market may imply that the purpose of securitizing is to gain some funds.  
9
Bannier & Hänsel (2007) measures bank liquidity by taking the ratio of the amount a bank has lent to 
other banks relative to the amount borrowed from other banks (Money Lent to Other Banks/Money 
Borrowed from Other Banks).  The study has found that banks that belong to the lowest deciles of such 
liquidity indicator have a high probability of securitizing.  
10
 See Note 1 
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also be seen through the less need among securitizing banks to hold liquid assets 
as liquidity buffers. The same study by Loustkina (2011) has shown that banks 
with more securitizable balance sheets also tend to hold less liquid assets in 
terms of reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs) and marketable securities.   
Building up on the central point of these studies, we look at the importance of 
securitization as a funding facility in terms of hedging illiquidity risk. Since 
securitization, provides banks with a funding source, then it may (aside from the 
effects found in the studies mentioned) have the potential of mitigating the risk 
concerns imposed by transactions that compromise the liquidity of the bank. In 
this study, we focus on one such transaction, that of loan commitments, which 
we discuss in the following section.      
 
B. Loan Commitments and Illiquidity Risk  
Loan commitments are contractual agreements entered by a bank, to lend to a 
specific borrower up to a certain amount at pre-specified terms. Loan 
commitments can be a good source of earnings for banks, because it involves 
various fees namely a commitment fee (an upfront fee paid as soon as the 
commitment is made), an annual service fee (which is based on the borrowed 
amount or the amount that has been taken down), and a usage fee (levied on the 
unused amount of credit). At the same time, an interest rate is also charged for 
the amount that has been taken down, which is based on a benchmark interest 
rate (e.g. prime rate, LIBOR) plus a certain premium11.  
Besides profits, other motivations for banks to offer loan commitments have 
been put forward. Loan commitments allow banks to have a means of forecasting 
future loan demands and can also be a way for banks to foster strong relations 
with its clients and keep their reputation as being richly funded12 (Ergungor 
2001). In addition, Kashyap, Rajan & Stein (2002) has pointed out that banks offer 
loan commitments alongside deposits because this makes further (and hence 
more efficient) use of costly liquid assets13 (than merely serving as a back-up for 
deposit withdrawals).   
On the other side of the contract, bank clients avail of loan commitments for 
several purposes. These include capital structure management, debt repayment, 
capital investment purposes and liquidity management (Shockley & Thakor 
                                                 
11
 An example of the fee structure of loan commitments may be found in Ergungor (2001). 
12
 Since the bank stands ready to lend to a client in a loan commitment contract, this sends a signal that 
the bank is in a good funding position.  
13
 The costliness of liquid assets here is in terms of opportunity costs as liquid assets are usually in the 
form of low yielding securities.  
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1996). Loan commitments are also especially useful for firms in times of tight 
market liquidity or when there is credit rationing, as the contractual agreement 
assures them of funds (Shockley & Thakor 1996, Ergungor 2001). In Holmström 
& Tirole (2000), the importance of loan commitments for firms during times of 
market distress is highlighted by the argument that loan commitment takedowns 
are more likely to happen during such periods. Further, firms may also go into 
loan commitments to hedge against interest rate risk (Saidenberg & Strahan 
1999). Since the interest rates to be paid on loan commitment takedowns are pre-
agreed, firms with loan commitments may be able to save on borrowing costs 
when interest rates suddenly spike, as opposed to borrowing directly from the 
commercial paper market. 
At the aggregate level, the importance of loan commitments has been 
recognized through its substantial contribution to bank liquidity creation. 
Current estimates show that about 80% of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) 
loans have come from loan commitment takedowns and close to 50% of total 
bank liquidity creation stems from loan commitments. It is also worth noting that 
loan commitments is a vital activity for banks in their liquidity creation function, 
because the relationship nature of a loan commitment contract gives banks the 
comparative advantage in such activity over other financial institutions 
(Saidenberg & Strahan 1999).      
However, the downside of loan commitments is that they pose illiquidity risk 
to the bank involved in such contract. This illiquidity risk imposition of loan 
commitments comes from the bank being obligated to lend to its client, the pre-
agreed amount (in part or in full) at any point in time. Given that the funding 
requirements of firms may be difficult to forecast, the timing and volume of loan 
commitment takedowns may be close to unknown. We note that the difficulty in 
anticipating the funding needs of the bank’s clients may persist, despite a long 
relationship that the bank may have kept with its clients. A reason for this 
persistence would be that the funding requirements may be influenced by 
unpredictable market factors, such as a dry-up in market liquidity that results to 
credit rationing. The tendency for loan commitments to impinge on the bank’s 
funding position, has been observed in Cornett, McNutt, Strahan & Tehranian 
(2010). The study has found that banks with high loan commitments had to 
restrict new lending during the Financial Crisis of 2007/09. Cornett, et. al. (2010) 
points out that this decreased lending capacity among banks with much loan 
commitments was caused by the sudden and large takedowns on the contracts 
resulting from the funding drought in the said crisis.  
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Hence, due to its responsibility of providing standby financing to its client 
with possibly unpredictable cash requirements, a bank that is a party to a loan 
commitment is exposed to having funding problems. In the next section, we 
review some of the ways by which banks have attempted to adress such 
illiquidity risk.  
 
III. Related Literature 
 
An immediate means for banks to manage to the potential funding problems 
posed by loan commitments is by having financial futures contracts that could 
supply the banks with the needed funds to meet the eventual loan commitment 
takedowns. However, a limitation of this strategy is that financial futures 
contracts may only be useful in answering loan commitment takedowns, if the 
banks can accurately predict the said takedowns, so as to coincide the timing of 
the futures contracts. As shown in Ho & Saunders (1983) and Koopenhaver 
(1985), the illiquidity risk of loan commitment takedowns may not be fully 
hedged through financial futures contracts, owing to the unpredictability of the 
takedowns.  
In Holmström & Tirole (2000) and Cornett, et.al. (2010), it has been cited that 
a way for banks to manage loan commitment takedowns is to hike up their liquid 
assets holdings. Kashyap, et. al. (2002) has provided a demonstration of this 
point, by showing that banks holding liquid assets may not only be for the 
purpose of backing deposit withdrawals, but also loan commitment takedowns. 
Liquid Assets as a funding buffer may, however, have some drawbacks. First is 
that holding them, as mentioned, can be costly14. At the same time, should 
deposit withdrawals and loan commitment takedowns happen simultaeously, 
liquid assets as funding back up for both events might have to make a 
compromise.  
Going a step further, Gatev, et.al.(2007) has shown that while deposits and 
loan commitments may create a more efficient use of liquid assets (as a liquidity 
buffer), deposits can also serve as a hedge on the illiquidity risk posed by loan 
commitments. Using the implied stock returns volatilities of 100 publicly traded 
US banks, as risk indicator, Gatev, et.al. (2007) has first shown that loan 
commitments are positively related to the stock returns volatilities of the said 
banks. With loan commitments having such positive effect on bank risk, this 
                                                 
14
 See Note 13 
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implies that loan commitments do have illiquidity risk implications. However, as 
loan commitments interact with transaction deposits, the study has found that 
this interaction between loan commitments and deposits have a negative effect 
on the stock returns volatility. In other words, the loan commitment-deposit 
synergy (as the study calls it), lowers bank risk. The explanation for such result is 
that deposits are a cheap funding source for banks, which may then give banks 
an easy means of meeting loan commitment takedowns. Thus, when banks take 
in deposits alongside loan commitments, they may be hedging the illiquidity risk 
implications of the loan commitments, reflected by the negative impact of the 
loan commitment-deposit synergy variable on bank risk.    
In further analyses, Gatev, et. al. (2007) points out that this interaction 
between loan commitments and deposits may be stronger when market liquidity 
is tight. Splitting the dataset between periods of high market liquidity and low 
market liquidity15, the study has found that the negative effect of the loan 
commitment-deposit synergy variable on bank risk is more economically 
significant on the periods of low market liquidity. This stronger hedging 
potential of transaction deposits for the tight market liquidity periods may be 
due to the greater deposit inflows and spike in loan commitment takedowns 
during the said periods. During times of market distress, banks experience more 
deposit inflows as they are perceived as safe havens due to deposit insurance 
and access to central bank liquidity support (Gatev & Strahan 2003). Meanwhile, 
under times of low market liquidity, banks also encounter more loan 
commitment takedowns due to credit rationing (Gatev & Strahan 2004). Thus, 
with more deposit taking and loan commitment takedown activity on periods of 
tight market liquidity, the hedging mechanism of deposits, shown by the loan 
commitment-deposit synergy variable, becomes more important in such periods.    
As we have pointed out, securitization provides banks with a funding facility. 
Moreover, we have also raised that securitization as a funding source for banks 
may be cheap (even cheaper than deposits), because being an off-balance sheet 
transaction, it does not require reserves and also does not involve a capital 
charge. From these, there is thus the possibility that securitization, like deposits, 
could also provide a hedge on the illiquidity risk posed by loan commitments. 
We investigate on this point in our following empirical analysis.  
                                                 
15
 A time of high market liquidity has been defined in the paper as the periods where the actual 
commercial paper vs. treasury bill spread is equal or below the average spread (75 basis points (bps)), 
while times of low market liquidity are periods where the spread is above the average spread.  Usage of 
the spread between a commercial paper rate and a Treasury bill rate as an indicator for market liquidity is 
explained and demonstrated in Krishnamurthy & Jorgensen (2008).      
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Data and Methodology 
To examine the capability of securitization to hedge against the illiquidity risk 
embodied in loan commitments, we follow the framework in Gatev, et.al. (2007), 
cited above. Hence, we take a measure for bank risk and examine its relationship 
with the bank’s loan commitments, as well as, its relationship with the 
interaction between the bank’s loan commitments and securitization activity or 
the loan commitment-securitization synergy variable. We also control for the 
bank’s securitization activity, separately, given that securitization does not affect 
bank funding only and may, in fact, also affect bank risk16.  Our baseline 
specification using panel estimation is thus as follows:  
        (1) 
  
Where: itY = risk measure of bank i at period t; itsCommitmentLoan = loan 
commitments of bank i at period t; ittionSecuritiza = securitization activity of bank 
i at period t; and itit tionSecuritizasCommitmentLoan * = the loan commitment-
securitization synergy variable for bank i at period t.  
To implement Equation (1), we take the balance sheet data of the Top 15017 
FDIC-member banks18, using the quarterly Call Reports they have submitted 
from 2001 to 2009. Eliminating banks with missing Call Reports and banks that 
may have been absorbed through mergers or may have closed, we are left with 
129 US-based banks.  As indicator for bank risk, we take the respective Z-scores 
of our sample banks. The Z-score is calculated as the Return on Assets 
(ROA)+Captal-to-Assets Ratio (CAR)/Standard Deviation of the ROA. The Z-
score is a measure of bank health in such a way that it indicates the number of 
standard deviations that the ROA of the bank has to fall before it defaults. Thus, 
the greater the number of standard deviations or the higher the Z-score, the 
healthier is the bank. We note that in Morris & Shin (2008), it has been shown 
that illiquidity risk is an important component of bank credit risk. Thus, usage of 
the Z-score which indicates overall bank credit risk, may be sufficient in 
capturing the illiquidity risk implications of loan commitments.  
                                                 
16
 As cited in the introduction, studies have shown that securitization may increase the incentives for 
banks to be more aggressive and less prudent in taking risks (See Note 4). Given this, securitization, on its 
own, may have an impact on the risk outcome of the bank.   
17
 In terms of Total Assets  
18
 As these banks are FDIC-member banks, our sample banks are therefore US based banks. However, we 
also implement our exercise on 27 European banks. The results of which are discussed in the Appendix.   
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In measuring loan commitments, we take the level of Unused Loan 
Commitments (ULCs) reported by the banks. ULCs are the loan commitments or 
the portion of the loan commitments that are outstanding and have not yet been 
taken down by the banks’ clients as of the reporting date. ULCs are thus the loan 
commitments that remain to pose illiquidity risk to the bank. We normalize 
ULCs to the banks’ reported Net Loans.  Given the illiquidity risk implications of 
loan commitments, higher loan commitments (relative to net loans) must then 
increase bank risk or lower bank health. Thus we expect that Loan Commitments 
must be negatively related to the Z-score (i.e. 01 <α ).  
Meanwhile, to measure securitization activity (Securitization), we take the sum 
of the amount of Bank Assets Sold and Securitized, and the Loans and Leases 
held for Sale reported by the banks. In this way we get to capture both the 
current and potential securitization activity of the banks. We normalize this 
figure to the bank’s Total Assets. We have mentioned that studies have pointed 
out that securitization may make the banks take on more risk19.  This would lead 
us to expect that securitization would lessen bank health. However, there have 
also been studies that argue that securitization can allow banks to manage risk20, 
relieve their capital constraints21 and improve bank returns22.  Given these 
opposing views on securitization, we thus not make a negative or a positive 
expectation on the effect of securitization on the Z-score.  
With our measures for loan commitments and securitization, we can then 
create an interaction term of both variables, to derive our loan commitment-
securitization synergy variable. In Gatev, et.al. (2007), the hedging of the 
illiquidity risk from loan commitments by deposits was observed through the 
loan commitment-deposit synergy variable having a negative effect on bank risk. 
In our case, we similarly expect that our loan commitment-securitization synergy 
variable must also be negatively related to bank risk or that it should be 
positively related to bank health. Our results must then show that the coefficient 
for Loan Commitments*Securitization must be positive (i.e. 03 >α ).  
 
                                                 
19
 See Note 4  
20
 Minton, Sanders & Strahan (2004), Bannier & Hänsel (2007), Goderis, Marsh, Costello & Wagner (2007), 
Panetta & Pozzolo (2010), Albertazzi, Eramo, Gambacorta & Salleo (2011)  
21
 Calomiris & Mason (2003), Minton, et. al. (2004), Karaoglu (2005), Pais (2005), Affinito & Tagliaferri 
(2008), Panetta & Pozzolo (2010)  
22
 Thomas (1999), Pais (2005), Karaoglu (2005), Bannier & Hänsel (2007), Goderis, et. al. (2007), Jiangli & 
Pritzker (2008) 
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B. Data Analysis  
As a first step in our data analysis, we rank our sample banks based on their 
respective average levels of securitization activity for the entire sample period. 
Following such, we classify the banks into three groups which we shall call the 
High-Securitizers (banks above the 67th percentile of the ranking), the Mid-
Securitizers  (banks between the 33rd and 67th percentile) and the Low-
Securitizers (banks below the 33rd percentile). Each bank group has 43 sample 
banks. We take the summary statistics of these three groups, which we report in 
Table 1.  
From Table 1 we can see that banks in the High-Securitizers Group have 
substantially higher Loan Commitments than banks in the Mid and Low-
Securitizers Group. This observation gives us some support to the point that 
securitization may indeed mitigate the illiquidity risk from loan commitments in 
the sense that the banks that securitize much, appear to be also the banks that can 
bear much loan commitments.  Meanwhile, looking at the trend of our 
dependent variable, the Z-score, we can see that the Z-score is decreasing 
monotonically on the level of securitization activity. Given this, we get the 
impression that securitization, could compromise the banks’ health or entails 
increased bank risk. However, considering that the banks in the High-
Securitizers Group are also the banks with the most loan commitments, the 
particularly low average Z-score of the banks in the High-Securitizers Group 
might also be due to the illiquidity risk posed by loan commitments. We get a 
clearer picture of this issue in the following discussion of our estimation results.      
 
C. Estimation Results 
The estimations results of our baseline specification are reported in Panel 1 of 
Table 2.  All our explanatory variables are statistically and economically 
significant. Loan Commitments is negatively related to the Z-score, as expected. 
This implies that loan commitments do pose illiquidity risk to banks and so 
corrodes the bank’s health or increases its risk profile.   As seen in Panel 1, a unit 
increase in Loan Commitments decreases bank health by about 0.37 units.23  
Turning to securitization activity, our results also show a negative 
relationship between Securitization and the Z-score, pointing out that 
securitization, on its own, may also decrease bank health. This finding may be 
due to the increased risk taking that securitization brings, as found by the studies 
we have mentioned earlier.  
                                                 
23
 Setting aside the possible hedging effect of Securitization  
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On our main variable of interest, we can see in Panel 1 of Table 2 that the 
interaction term of Loan Commitments and Securitization is positively related to 
the Z-score. We see that a unit increase in our loan commitments-securitization 
synergy variable increases bank health by 0.72 units. In terms of net effects, we 
have that a unit increase in securitization activity that accompanies the unit 
increase in loan commitments, can wipe out the illiquidity risk posed by such 
loan commitments, while increasing bank health by 0.21 units.  Through this 
result we take that while securitization may be risky in itself (as found earlier), it 
has the capability of hedging the illiquidity risk from loan commitments. To 
further confirm and enrich this finding, we do a number of additional empirical 
analyses in the following section.           
 
V. Additional Empirical Analyses 
 
We perform three sets of additional empirical analyses. The first set is meant to 
test for the robustness of our earlier results by adding control variables that are 
generally known to have an influence on bank health, especially through its 
liquidity position. Meanwhile, the second set of our additional empirical analysis 
is meant to deepen our earlier findings, by checking if the hedge on the 
illiquidity risk from loan commitments provided by securitization stands in both 
periods of calm and distressed markets. In our third set of additional empirical 
analysis, we re-do our estimations in the first and second set, but this time using 
other measures of bank risk, namely stock returns volatilities and the CDS 
spreads. The purpose of doing our third set of additional empirical analysis is to 
serve as a further robustness test for our results involving the Z-score as bank 
risk measure.  
 
A. Additional Control Variables 
We cannot discount the fact that bank health may be affected by market factors 
as well as factors that are specific to the bank. Thus, to account for these market 
factors we add control variables for the overall situation of the economy 
(measured by the returns on the S&P 500 Index), the extent of market of liquidity 
(measured by the spread between the 3-month commercial paper (CP) rate and 
the 3-month Treasury Bill (Tbill) rate)24 and the level of market interest rates 
(measured by the quotes on 1-year Interest Rate Swaps). We source our data for 
                                                 
24
 See Note 15 
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the S&P 500 Index from Datastream, while our data for the interest rates are 
taken from the Federal Reserve Database. 
For the bank-specific factors, we include in our specification the Log of Assets 
(to account for bank size), the Liquid Assets to Assets ratio (to account for bank 
liquidity), the CAR (to account for capitalization) and the Income to Assets ratio 
(to account for profitability)25. Moreover, given the findings in Gatev, et.al. 
(2007), where deposits can hedge the illiquidity risk from loan commitments, we 
also add the variables of Change in Deposits-to-Liabilities ratio (Deposit Inflows) 
and an interaction term between Deposit Inflows and Loan Commitments. 
Further, considering that Credit Enhancements on securitization activities may 
also have an effect on the bank’s liquidity26, we account for this in our 
estimations by including a dummy variable of 1 if the bank extends credit 
enhancements on its securitization activities. At the same time, we also add a 
dummy variable of 1 if the bank operates locally (i.e. the bank’s branches are 
concentrated in only a certain state or region). We do this to take note of the 
depth of the bank’s funding base, where banks with smaller (i.e. local) operations 
may have a less deep funding base, than those that operate on a wide scale (i.e. 
nationwide).  Lastly, we also consider if the bank is owned by a foreign company 
by adding a variable of 1 if the bank belongs to a foreign holding company. Our 
basis for adding such control variable is that, banks that are foreign owned may 
enjoy some support from its holding company (especially during liquidity 
problems) and may also operate under a different set of rules or strategy. We 
take all the information we need for our bank-specific control variables from the 
same quarterly Call Reports submitted to the FDIC by our sample banks.      
We report the summary statistics for our additional bank-specific control 
variables in Table 1. We observe in Table 1 that securitization activity may not be 
very much related to bank size. As we can see in Table 1, average bank size does 
not vary much among the different banks, grouped according their extent of 
securitization activity. However, we find that High-Securitizers have much 
liquid assets27, more capital and are more profitable, relative to the banks that 
                                                 
25
 Accounting for the bank’s profitability is particularly important as we use the Z-score as the bank risk 
indicator. This is because the Z-score takes into account, both the bank’s profitability and liquidity.  
26
 Credit Enhancements are special features in securitization transactions wherein the securitizing bank 
gives a certain form of guarantee, such as standing ready to settle part of the liability or expected payoffs 
(in case the underlying loans default). A Credit Enhancement of this form (called a Line of Credit) may 
have an impact on the bank’s liquidity. A comprehensive discussion of Credit Enhancements and its 
different types may be found in Lea (2006).    
27
 This observation is a divergence from the findings in Panetta & Pozzolo (2010) and Loutskina (2011) 
cited earlier. 
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securitize less. An explanation for the higher average liquid assets among the 
High-Securitizers Group is that, due to also having more loan commitments, 
banks in this group may have opted to also hold more liquidity buffers28 (despite 
the hedge on the illiquidity risk from loan commitments that securitization could 
provide). Meanwhile, the higher average CAR among the High-Securitizers may 
be due to the capital-relief provided by securitization where, as loans are 
securitized, they leave the bank balance sheet which frees up some capital29. On 
the higher Income-to-Assets ratio, the High-Securitizers may be more profitable 
through the profit-augmenting effects of securitization30.  Lastly, our summary 
statistics also show that the High-Securitizers have less deposits than the Mid 
and Low-Securitizers. As we have dicussed, securitization provides a funding 
facility for banks that may be cheaper than deposits. Hence, banks that securitize 
much may depart from heavily financing themselves through deposits and use 
securitization instead.      
More importantly, we report our estimation results in Panel 2 of Table 2. We 
can see in our estimation results that our main variables of interest maintain their 
statistical and economic significance in relation to our dependent variable, after 
adding both sets of control variables for market factors and bank-specific factors. 
The respective relationships of our main variables of interest to bank risk are also 
sustained. Loan Commitments remain negatively related to the Z-score, showing 
its illiquidity risk implication. We can also still observe the risk implication of 
securitization activities, with Securitization being negatively related to the Z-
score. Most notably, we find that the loan-commitment securitization synergy 
variable is still positively related to the Z-score, and that this positive effect also 
remains economically larger than the negative effect of Loan Commitments on the 
Z-score. This persistence of the respective impacts of our main variables of 
interest to our bank risk indicator serves as a strong support for the earlier 
findings under our baseline specification.   
Among our control variables for market factors, the variables that are 
statistically significant are the spreads on the CP vs Tbill and 1-year Swap Rate. 
Our CP vs Tbill Spread variable represents the market liquidity situation or 
market distress. Higher CP vs Tbill spreads indicate a tighter market liquidity or 
market distress, which makes us expect a negative relationship between this 
variable and the Z-score. In Panel 2, we indeed see a negative and economically 
                                                 
28
 As pointed out in Holström & Tirole (2000),  Kashyap, Rajan & Stein (2002) and Cornett, Mcnutt, 
Strahan & Tehranian (2010) 
29
 See Note 21 
30
 See Note 22  
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significant effect from CP vs Tbill Spread on bank health. On the other hand, the 
1-year Swap Rate has a positive and economically significant effect on the Z-
score. Interest rate swaps may be an investment outlet for the bank, in the sense 
that this is the bank’s lending rate to other financial institutions. Hence, higher 
swap rates could mean better profits and, consequently, bank health 
improvement.  
On our bank-specific control variables, we see that the Log of Assets, Liquid 
Assets/Assets, CAR and Income/Assets are all statistically significant. Log of 
Assets has a negative and economically significant effect on the Z-score. An 
explanation for this negative effect is that bigger banks, tend to take in more risk 
and a wider range of activities, such that bank health may be compromised. 
Liquid Assets/Assets also has a negative impact on the Z-score, which may be 
attributed to the costliness of holding liquid assets due to their low yields. Both 
CAR and Income/Assets, meanwhile, have a positive effect on the Z-score. Since 
a higher CAR usually means that the bank is more stable, it is then not surprising 
that this variable increases bank health. On the other hand, higher 
Income/Assets mean that the bank is profitable which should also imply that the 
bank is healthy.  
We note that our dummy variables for the banks’ extension of credit 
enhancements, their extent of operations and if they are owned by a foreign 
entity are also statistically significant. However, we withhold the discussion on 
their respective effects on bank risk, as our main purpose for adding these 
control variables is to see if controlling for them does not erode our earlier 
findings. As pointed out, following the addition of our sets of control variables 
(including the said dummy variables), our results and its implications remain the 
same.  
 
B. Periods of Market Distress 
As we have firmly established that securitization can hedge against the 
illiquidity risk posed by loan commitments, we try to enrich this finding by 
investigating if this hedge provided by securitization holds in both calm markets 
and distressed markets scenarios. In Gatev, et.al. (2007), it has been found that 
deposits can hedge the illiquidity risk from loan commitments in both periods of 
non-tight market liquidity and tight market liquidity. Further, the study stresses 
that the illiquidity risk hedge provided by deposits becomes more important, 
during periods of tight market liquidity or market distress. At the same time, it 
has also been pointed out in Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011) and in 
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Loutskina (2011), that securitization as a funding facility for banks is important 
during funding shocks. Specifically, the studies have shown that during funding 
shocks (i.e. tight market liquidity periods), banks that can securitize more can 
sustain and even increase their granting and holding of loans.    
To identify between periods of calm and distressed markets, we follow the 
strategy employed in Gatev, et.al. (2007). We first take the average CP vs Tbill 
spread for the entire sample period, which in our case, is at 47bps. Given this 
figure, we compare it with the actual CP vs Tbill spread, for each period. The 
periods whose actual spreads are equal or below the average spread are 
considered as the periods of non-tight market liquidity (i.e. calm markets), while 
those whose spreads are above the average spread  are the tight market liquidity 
periods (i.e. distressed markets). We have found that our periods of calm 
markets31 are the periods 2001-2007:2 and 2009:3-2009:4, while our periods of 
distressed markets32 are from 2007:3 to 2009:2. It is interesting to note that our 
periods of tight market liquidity, greatly coincide with the Financial Crisis of 
2007/09. Having identified these periods, we then split our sample according to 
these periods and re-estimate our equations (including our additional control 
variables). The results for periods of calm markets are in Panel 3 of Table 2, while 
those for the periods of distressed markets are in Panel 4 of Table 2.   
We find in both Panels 3 and 4 that Loan Commitments and the loan 
commitment-securitization synergy variable retain their statistical and economic 
significance as well their respective effects on the Z-score. Loan Commitments is 
still negatively related to the Z-score, again implying illiquidity risk. At the same 
time, the loan commitment-securitization synergy variable also stays positive in 
relation to the Z-score. However, comparing the respective coefficients of Loan 
Commitments and the loan commitment-securitization synergy variable in Panels 
3 and 4, we do not see that securitization can hedge the illiquidity risk coming 
from loan commitments more on the periods of tight market liquidity, than on 
the periods of non-tight market liquidity. In fact, during the periods of market 
distress, securitization may be hedging the illiquidity risk from loan 
commitments only partially (than hedging it completely, as in the periods of 
calm markets). To point this out in economic terms, during the market distress 
periods, the illiquidity risk implication of a unit increase in loan commitments is 
a decrease in bank health of 1.48 units, which can be tempered down to 0.84 
                                                 
31
 The periods where the CP vs. Tbill spread is equal or below the average spread of 47bps. See 
Krishnamurthy & Jorgensen (2008) for explanation and demonstration of using the spread the CP vs. Tbill 
spread as indicator for market liquidity. 
32
 The period where the CP vs. Tbill spread is above the average spread of 47bps.  
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units, for an accompanying unit increase in securitization activity. However 
during the periods of calm markets, the decrease in bank health amounting to 
0.51 units for every increase in loan commitments, can be completely covered by 
the 0.68 units increase in bank health brought by an increase in securitization 
activity (that accompanies the unit rise in loan commitments).  
Given these results, what we can say then is that securitization can provide a 
hedge against the illiquidity risk posed by loan commitments in both periods of 
tight and non-tight market liquidity. However, at the times of market distress, 
the hedging effect of securitization may not be stronger, unlike that which has 
been found by Gatev, et.al. (2007), in the case of deposits. In fact, the hedging 
effect of securitization might be weakened, when market liquidity is tight. What 
may explain this particular finding is that during periods of market distress, 
banks may not be able to enjoy inflows from securitization (as much as it may in 
the case of deposits). Considering that our period of tight market liquidity here is 
the period of the Financial Crisis 2007/09, this may just be the case. During the 
recent financial crisis, the securitization market collapsed and securitization 
inflows of the banks during the said periods came mostly just from the 
intervention of the Federal Reserve Bank.    
 
C. Alternative Bank Risk Measures 
Using a balance sheet-based measure of bank risk, that is the Z-score, we have 
pointed out the capability of securitization to hedge against the illiquidity risk 
posed by loan commitments. Further, using the same bank risk measure, we 
have also shown that the said hedging ability of securitization may also apply in 
both times of calm markets and distressed markets. In this section we seek a 
further confirmation of our findings by using market-based bank risk measures 
namely, Stock Returns Volatility and CDS Spreads.  
 
i. Using Alternative Risk Measures 1: Stock Returns Volatility   
One of the most commonly used risk measure for firms, including banks, is the 
Stock Returns Volatility. To measure Stock Returns Volatility of our sample 
banks, we take the quarterly change of their stock returns. To get the banks’ 
quarterly stock returns, we first take the weekly change in their stock prices and 
then average the figures by quarter. We derive our stock price information from 
Datastream. Unfortunately, not all of the 129 banks in our sample have complete 
data on their stock prices. We then had to eliminate these banks with no or 
incomplete stock price data. This lowers our number of sample banks to 68.  
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Unlike the Z-score, the implication of stock return volatilities is that the 
higher it is, the more risky is the bank. This changes the expected signs of our 
coefficients. We now expect that 0, 21 >αα , due to the respective risk 
implications of Loan Commitments and Securitization that we have found in our 
previous estimations. At the same time, we expect that 03 <α  , as securitization 
accompanying loan commitments, hedges the illiquidity risk from loan 
commitments. 
Table 3 reports our estimation results using the stock returns volatility as 
bank risk indicator. Results concerning the entire sample period (Panel 1) show 
that all our variables of interest are statistically and economically significant. 
They also have their expected signs. We find a positive relationship between 
Loan Commitments and Stock Returns Volatility, showing anew the illiquidity risk 
posed by loan commitments. There is also a positive relationship between 
Securitization and Stock Returns Volatility, pointing out the risk implications of 
securitization activities. Securitization activities, however, hedge illiquidity risk 
(just as before), as seen through the loan commitment-securitization synergy 
variable being negatively related to Stock Returns Volatility. With these results, 
we get a verification of our earlier finding on the Z-score.   
Meanwhile, in Panel 2, we present the estimation results for the non-tight 
market liquidity period. We see that our results are still maintained under 
periods of calm markets.  On the other hand, Panel 3, which concerns the 
estimations results for the periods of distressed markets, shows that Loan 
Commitments and the loan commitment-securitization synergy variable are no 
longer statistically significant. Nonetheless, the said variables still bear their 
expected signs.  We take these results in Panels 2 & 3 as a confirmation of our 
findings in the previous section, that there might have been a weakened 
capability of securitization to hedge against the illiquidity risk from loan 
commitments, during the periods of market distress that we have considered.  
On our control variables, we highlight the respective effects of Deposit 
Inflows and the interaction term between Loan Commitments and Deposit 
Inflows. Deposit Inflows has a positive effect on Stock Returns Volatility, while 
the interaction term between Loan Commitments and Deposit Inflows has a 
negative effect. The effects of the variables are significant in Panels 1 and 3. This 
set of results concurs with the findings in Gatev, et. al. (2007).   
 
ii. Using Alternative Risk Measures 2: CDS Spreads 
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A relatively new risk indicator that is gaining popularity is CDS Spreads. CDS 
spreads price contracts (called CDS contracts) that are made to serve as 
protection against a credit event, such as a default by an entity specified in the 
contract. Hence, being a price for protection against credit risk, CDS spreads 
have been viewed as a reliable risk indicator.33  
Since CDS are a new concept, our data set gets a little limited in this exercise. 
For this specification, we only have 43 sample banks. These 43 sample banks are 
the only banks in our original sample of 129 banks that are involved in CDS 
contracts, where they are specified as the sole entity in the said contracts (i.e. 
Single-name CDS Contracts)34. An additional limitation to our data is that our 
series of CDS spread quotes from Datastream begins at 2004.35 Thus, our sample 
period gets reduced to 2004-2009.      
Like stock returns volatility, higher CDS spreads mean higher risks. Our 
expected signs for the coefficients of our key variables will therefore be the same 
as that of our estimation with the stock returns volatility. We report our 
estimation results in Table 4. Our variables of interest continue to be all 
statistically and economically significant and bear as well their expected signs. 
This is the case whether we consider our entire sample period or distinguish 
between periods of calm markets and distressed markets. Both loan 
commitments and securitization are found to still pose risks to the banks, shown 
by their positive effect on CDS spreads. At the same time, the illiquidity risk 
posed by loan commitments may still be toned down by securitization, with the 
loan commitment and securitization interaction term having a negative effect on 
CDS spreads. Our results with the CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator, thus 
sustain our earlier findings on the illiquidity risk hedge by securitization.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
As loans that have been securitized are used as underlying assets to borrow 
funds through debt, securitization transforms otherwise illiquid loans to cash. In 
this way, securitization provides banks with an alternative funding facility. 
Many studies have shown, that banks may have used securitization to address 
their funding issues. Some studies have also found that there is indeed funding 
                                                 
33
See Longstaff, Mithal & Neis (2003)  
34
 We note that only CDS spreads on Single-name CDS contracts are eligible for use as risk indicator of 
certain firm because such spreads directly and solely price the risk being taken by the CDS contract seller 
on the firm or the issuer of the underlying debt.  
35
 This is also the case for other databases.  
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from securitization, as evidenced by secrutizing banks being able to grant and 
hold more loans, and save on costly liquidity buffers. In this study, we add to the 
value of securitization as a funding source, by showing that securitization may 
also be used to mitigate possible funding problems. In particular, we have shown 
that securitization, through its provision of a funding facility, can hedge against 
the illiquidity risk that loan commitments pose (due to the unpredictability of the 
takedowns on these contracts).     
Given that a chief role of banks is to serve as liquidity providers and that loan 
commitments is an important tool for the banks in playing this said function, the 
ability of securitization to ease the illiquidity risk of loan commitments may 
serve as basis for the continued practice of securitization. However, with 
securitization having been greatly involved in the Financial Crisis of 2007/09, 
confidence in securitization transactions both on the side of banks and on the 
side of investors have been low. Compounding to the concerns of sustaining 
securitization as a bank activity are the many studies that have shown its risk 
implications, which this study has also found.  
At the core on the risk issues of securitization is the erosion of bank incentives 
to prudently take risks. This springs from securitization giving banks a means to 
isolate themselves from loans that they may eventually deem to risky. Since 
loans leave the balance sheet when they are securitized, banks therefore 
experience a removal of risk. As found in a good number of studies, banks have 
exploited this property of securitization by taking on more and even too much 
risk and/or by being negligent in their screening and monitoring of borrowers36. 
However, this misalignment of incentives is not without solution. Chiesa (2008), 
for example, demonstrates that through an optimal level of Credit Enhancements 
in securitization transactions, banks may retain enough risk exposures on their 
securitized loans37. The result of such would be that the incentive for banks to 
continue to monitor their loans is restored. Likewise, in Albertazzi, Eramo, 
Gambacorta & Salleo (2011), it has been pointed that if banks securitize with the 
sole intention of having it as a sustainable funding source, then the securitizing 
banks will be motivated to ensure that their loans are of good quality.  
The challenge of efficiently using securitization as a funding facility then, lies 
on the way a bank executes it and/or structures its securitization deal. If a bank 
structures its securitization transactions, where the incentives towards prudent 
                                                 
36
 See Note 4 
37
 The form of Credit Enhancement referred to in this study is the bank giving its securitization investors 
the option to sell back the underlying loans at a given price. Thus, some form of retention of risk exposure 
takes place as the loan may return to the bank balance sheet at any point in time.  
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risk-taking are maintained, then such securitizing bank may reap much benefit 
from the capability of securitization to hedge against illiquidity risk. 
Securitization as a funding facility is then like a tricky tool, its inadequate usage 
can create a mess but its careful use makes it work just right.    
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Volume of Securitization Activities/Assets  (Sec) 
Sampling Period: 2001:4-2009:4,  
Total No. Of Banks: 129, No. of 
Banks in Each Group: 43 
Low-Securitizers  
(Sec ≤ 33rd 
Percentile)  
Mid-Securitizers 
(33rd 
Percentile<Sec≤ 
67th Percentile) 
High-Securitizers 
(67th 
Percentile< Sec)  
Loan Commitments 126.730 56.103 378.860 
Log of Assets  16.372 16.569 16.963 
Liquid Assets/Assets  6.940 8.657 13.224 
CAR 10.862 10.965 14.200 
Income/Assets 0.619 0.445 0.900 
Deposits/Liabilities  71.844 79.464 66.747 
Z-score  26.110 21.382 17.497 
Stock Returns Volatility 1.525 2.166 1.417 
CDS Spread  62.705 54.562 135.430 
Balance sheet data are taken from FDIC Quarterly Call Reports. The Z-score is calculated as 
ROA+CAR/SD ROA which measures the number of standard deviations a bank’s ROA has to fall before it 
defaults. Stock Returns Volatility is measured as the quarterly change in stock returns of every bank. 
Stock Returns Volatility refers to 68 sample banks only. CDS Spread refers to 43 sample banks only. CDS 
spread data runs from 2004-2009 only.  Stock returns data and CDS spread data are taken from 
Datastream.           
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Table 2. Securitzation and Illiquidity Risk with Z-score as Bank Risk Indicator 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Z-score 
 
Entire Period (2001:4-2009:4) 
Non-Tight Period 
(2001:4-
2007:2,2009:3-
2009:4) 
Tight Period 
(2007:3-
2009:2) 
  1 2 3 4 
Independent Variables  
    Loan Commitments -0.368*** -0.583*** -0.512*** -1.480*** 
 
(-14.618) (-16.754) (-15.183) (-11.382) 
Securitization -0.150*** -0.148*** -0.140*** -0.092*** 
 
(-31.140) (-25.335) (-25.374) (-6.323) 
Loan Commitments*Securitization 0.724*** 0.662*** 0.679*** 0.638*** 
 
(15.418) (12.450) (13.063) (4.291) 
Control Variables for Market Situation  
   S&P 500 Index Returns - 0.003 -0.069 -0.029 
  
(0.079) (-1.428) (-0.682) 
CP vs Tbill Spread  - -0.726*** - - 
  
(-2.762) 
  1-Year Swap Rate  - 0.143*** 0.124** -0.581*** 
  
(2.684) (2.518) (-3.820) 
Control Variables for Bank Specific Factors  
   Log of Assets  - -0.393*** -0.175** -1.722*** 
  
(-5.128) (-1.998) (-11.081) 
Liquid Assets/Assets - -0.037*** 0.015 -0.060*** 
  
(-4.203) (1.549) (-4.987) 
CAR - 0.562*** 0.447*** 1.241*** 
  
(27.892) (23.525) (24.104) 
Income/Assets - 1.045*** 0.531*** 2.852*** 
  
(9.178) (4.922) (11.772) 
Deposit Inflows  - 0.634 0.100 -5.549* 
  
(0.732) (0.145) (-1.800) 
Loan Commitments*Deposit 
Inflows  - -0.045 -0.036 0.494 
  
(-1.117) (-0.949) (1.059) 
Local Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Dummies  No Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Enhancements No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3783 3655 2643 883 
No. Of Banks 129 129 129 129 
R-squared  0.326 0.533 0.686 0.730 
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Table 2 (Previous Page) Notes: The dependent variable is the Z-score as bank risk indicator. Securitization 
is calculated as the reported level of Bank Assets Sold and Securitized and Loans and Leases Held for Sale 
(normalized to Total Assets).  Market Return is the return on the S&P 500 Index. CP vs Tbill Spread is the 
difference between the 3-month Non-Financial Commercial Paper Rate and the 3-month Tbill Rate. Swap 
Rate is the 1-year Interest Rate Swaps. All data for the market control variables are taken from 
Datastream. Panels 1 & 2 present the estimation results for the entire sample period of 2001:4-2009:4. 
Panel 1 presents the baseline specification. Panel 2 adds market control variables and control variables for 
bank-specific characteristics. Panel 3 presents the estimation results for the Non-Tight Market Liquidity 
Period (2001:4-2007:2, 2009:3-2009:4). Panel 4 presents the estimation results for the Tight Market 
Liquidity Period (2007:3-2009:2). The Non-Tight Market Liquidity Period is defined as the period where 
the CP vs Tbill spread is equal or below the average level throughout the sample period of 2001-2009.  
The Tight Market Liquidity Period is defined as the period where the CP vs Tbill spread is above the 
average level throughout the sample period. The calculated average CP vs Tbill spread for the entire 
sample period is 47bps. Since Market Liquidity is already accounted for in Panels 3 and 4, the CP vs Tbill as 
control variable for Market Liquidity is taken out in the specification.  Items in parenthesis report the t-
statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All 
regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 3. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk with Stock Returns Volatility as 
Bank Risk Indicator 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Stock Returns Volatility  
 
Entire Period 
(2001:4-
2009:4) 
Non-Tight Period (2001:4-
2007:2,2009:3-2009:4) 
Tight Period 
(2007:3-2009:2) 
  1 2 3 
Independent Variables  
   Loan Commitments 0.624*** 0.535*** 0.570 
 
(3.777) (4.319) (1.198) 
Securitization 0.051*** 0.017** 0.124*** 
 
(4.332) (2.087) (3.443) 
Loan Commitments*Securitization -0.482*** -0.385*** -0.007 
 
(-3.038) (-3.813) (-1.190) 
Control Variables for Market Situation  
  S&P 500 Index Returns 0.099 0.864*** -0.755*** 
 
(1.012) (10.613) (-4.963) 
CP vs Tbill Spread  6.901*** - - 
 
(10.943) 
  1-Year Swap Rate  -2.067*** -0.951*** -4.403*** 
 
(-16.402) (-11.500) (-8.397) 
Control Variables for Bank Specific Items  
  Log of Assets  0.255 -0.185* 0.554 
 
(1.577) (-1.777) (1.159) 
Liquid Assets/Assets 1.164 -0.001 0.033 
 
(0.877) (-0.041) (0.730) 
CAR -0.009 -0.024 -0.075 
 
(-0.358) (-1.343) (-0.752) 
Income/Assets -2.010*** -0.845*** -2.373*** 
 
(-10.914) (-5.985) (-5.271) 
Deposit Inflows 6.216*** 2.231** 12.354** 
 
(3.554) (2.190) (2.388) 
Loan Commitments*Deposit Inflows  -0.617** -0.080 -2.673** 
 
(2.254) (-0.588) (-2.533) 
Local Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Enhancements Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1897 1369 461 
No. Of Banks 68 68 68 
R-squared  0.264 0.234 0.310 
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Table 3 (Previous page) Notes: The dependent variable is the Stock Returns Volatility as bank risk 
indicator. Stock Returns Volatility is measured as the quarterly change in stock returns of every bank. 
Note that higher Stock Returns Volatility mean more risk. Thus, the expected signs of our key variables are 
the inverse of what we expected with the Z-score as bank risk indicator.  Panel 1 presents the estimation 
results for the entire sample period with market control variables and control variables for bank-specific 
characteristics. Panel 2 presents the estimation results for the Non-Tight Market Liquidity Period (2001:4-
2007:2, 2009:3-2009:4).  Panel 3 presents the estimation results for the Tight Market Liquidity Period 
(2007:3-2009:2). Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 
the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 4. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk with CDS Spreads as Bank Risk 
Indicator 
 
Dependent Variable: CDS Spread 
 
Entire Period 
(2001:4-2009:4) 
Non-Tight Period (2001:4-
2007:2,2009:3-2009:4) 
Tight Period 
(2007:3-
2009:2) 
  1 2 3 
Independent Variables  
   Loan Commitments 2.049*** 0.516* 5.786*** 
 
(3.954) (1.804) (3.570) 
Securitization 0.443*** 0.174*** 1.499*** 
 
(5.134) (3.158) (4.934) 
Loan Commitments*Securitization -3.012*** -1.226*** -7.529*** 
 
(-5.027) (-3.292) (-4.008) 
Control Variables for Market Situation  
   S&P 500 Index Returns 3.630*** 3.817*** 2.580*** 
 
(5.272) (6.500) (2.723) 
CP vs Tbill Spread  27.191*** - - 
 
(6.439) 
  1-Year Swap Rate  -9.331*** -2.794*** -23.617*** 
 
(-10.439) (-5.483) (-6.602) 
Control Variables for Bank Specific 
Items  
   Log of Assets  -0.646 1.614*** -11.723*** 
 
(-0.624) (2.777) (-3.024) 
Liquid Assets/Assets 0.333*** 0.221*** 1.016*** 
 
(4.006) (4.026) (4.170) 
CAR -0.212 0.214** -1.007 
 
(-1.309) (2.388) (-1.551) 
Income/Assets -6.884*** -1.717** -11.048*** 
 
(-4.891) (-2.040) (-2.829) 
Deposit Inflows  6.923 3.737 55.400 
 
(0.956) (0.955) (1.642) 
Loan Commitments*Deposit Inflows  -0.618 0.028 -11.214** 
 
(-0.664) (0.050) (-2.566) 
CDS_BA 10.933*** 12.756*** 8.869*** 
 
(43.341) (44.529) (23.224) 
Local Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Enhancements Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  967 642 283 
No. Of Banks 43 43 43 
R-squared  0.794 0.857 0.809 
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Table 4 (Previous page) Notes: The dependent variable is the CDS Spreads, as bank risk indicator. Note 
that higher CDS Spreads mean more risk. Thus, the expected signs of our key variables are the inverse of 
what we expected with the Z-score as risk indicator.  Panel 1 presents the estimation results for the entire 
sample period with market control variables and control variables for bank-specific characteristics. Panel 
2 presents the estimation results for the Non-Tight Market Liquidity Period (2001:4-2007:2, 2009:3-
2009:4).  Panel 3 presents the estimation results for the Tight Market Liquidity Period (2007:3-2009:2). 
CDS_BA is the gap between the bid-ask quote of the CDS spread. CDS_BA is added in the specifications for 
the CDS spread to take into account the demand and supply of the CDS contract (see Bongearts, De Jong 
& Driessen 2005). Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 
the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Appendix:  The Case of the European Banks 
 
Having established that securitization can be used as a hedge against the 
illiquidity risk from loan commitments among US banks, we consider here the 
case of European banks. Due to limitations in data sources, we have a smaller 
dataset for this exercise, involving only the top 27 European banks, with the 
quarterly series running from 2004 to 2009. We source our balance sheet data for 
our European banks from Bankscope.  
Since Bankscope does not provide information on the securitization activity 
of our sample banks, we measure securitization activity in a way similar to that 
of Loutskina (2005). We estimate quarterly securitization activity for each bank 
by multiplying the reported level of bank loans to the ratio of securitized loans to 
total loans of the bank’s home economy.  Mathematically: 
jt
jt
LoansAggregate
LoansdSecuritize
itit LoansActivitytionSecuritiza *=                                (A1) 
where, 
itLoans  is the reported loans of bank i at quarter t, jtLoansdSecuritize is the 
aggregate amount of securitized loans of home economy j of bank i at quarter t 
and jtLoansAggregate  is the aggregate amount of loans of home economy j of 
bank i at quarter t.   
The total amount of securitized loans of each European economy is reported 
by the European Securitization Forum (ESF), while the aggregate level of loans 
may be sourced from the central banks of the respective home economies of our 
sample banks.   
Given these estimates for securitization activity, we normalize them against 
Total Assets, and use the averages for our entire sample period to rank our 
sample banks. Like what we have done with the US banks, we divide the sample 
banks into three groups based on the extent of their average securitization 
activity. The summary statistics of our European sample banks (broken into 
groups) is reported in Table A1. Just as in the case of US banks, we see that the 
High-Securitizers have higher Loan Commitments, and thus may have more 
capability of bearing illiquidity risk. However, we cannot glean from Table A1 
that more securitization as well as more loan commitments, strictly involves 
higher risk for the European banks.  While Stock Returns Volatility increase as 
we move from the Low to the High-Securitizers Group, the High-Securitizers, at 
the same time, have higher Z-scores and lower CDS spreads compared to the 
Low-Securitizers. 
Table A2 reports our estimation results with different bank risk measures. 
Panel 1 shows the estimations results with the Z-score as the bank risk indicator. 
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We find that the results are the same as that of the US case. Loan Commitments 
negatively affects the Z-score, just as Securitization is also negatively related to 
the Z-score. At the same time, our loan commitment-securitization synergy 
variable is positively related to the Z-score.  These results point out that the 
hedging capability of securitization against the illiquidity risk coming from loan 
commitments, may also be applicable to the case of European banks.  
Our results in Panel 1 are supported by the findings in Panels 2 and 3. Panel 2 
presents the results with the Stock Returns Volatility as bank risk indicator, while 
Panel 3 does the same with the CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator. We note, 
however, that in the case of Panel 3, we only have 21 sample banks because these 
are the only banks that have active quotes for their CDS spreads. We can see in 
both Panels 2 and 3 that loan commitments increase bank risk, while the loan 
commitment-securitization synergy variable decreases bank risk.    
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Table A1. Summary Statistics for the Case of European Banks 
 
 
Volume of Securitization Activities/Assets  (Sec) 
Sampling Period: 2004:4-2009:4, Total 
No. Of Banks: 27, No. of Banks in Each 
Group: 9 
Low Securitizers  
(Sec ≤ 33rd 
Percentile)  
Mid-Securitizers 
(33rd Percentile < 
Sec ≤ 67th 
Percentile) 
High-Securitizers 
(67th Percentile ≤ 
Sec)  
  1 2 3 
Loan Commitments 39.926 33.739 46.712 
Log of Assets  11.368 12.249 13.534 
Liquid Assets/Assets  22.438 18.842 20.065 
CAR 5.061 5.368 4.689 
Income/Assets 0.579 0.609 0.503 
Deposits/Liabilities  56.291 62.129 56.599 
Z-score  25.768 24.406 46.260 
Stock Returns Volatility 12.688 13.517 13.736 
CDS Spread  80.274 56.485 56.780 
Securitization activity of each bank is calculated by multiplying the reported amount of loans to the ratio 
of the securitized loans to total loans of the home economy of the bank. Balance sheet data for our 
European Banks are taken from Bankscope. Unused Loan Commitments are reported in Bankscope as 
Committed Credit Lines.  The Z-score is calculated as ROA+CAR/SD ROA which measures the number of 
standard deviations a bank’s ROA has to fall before it defaults. Stock Returns Volatility is measured as the 
absolute quarterly change in stock returns of every bank. CDS Spread refers to only 21 sample banks. 
Stock returns data and CDS spread data are taken from Datastream.           
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Table A2. Securitization and Illiquidity Risk, the Case of European Banks  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Z-Score 
Stock Returns 
Volatility 
CDS Spreads 
Sampling Period: 2004:4-2009:4 1 2 3 
Independent Variables  
   Loan Commitments -0.205*** 0.101* 0.643*** 
 
(-4.828) (1.711) (2.998) 
Securitization -3.619*** 4.660*** 17.729*** 
 
(-4.184) (4.012) (4.329) 
Loan Commitments*Securitization 0.136*** -0.081*** -0.338*** 
 
(7.199) (-3.444) (-3.911) 
Control Variables for Market Situation  
   FTSE EuroTop Index Returns -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 
 
(-1.426) (-0.757) (-0.811) 
Commercial Paper vs Gbond Spread  1.386 8.170*** 54.443*** 
 
(1.647) (6.556) (14.673) 
1-Year Swap Rate  -1.370*** -0.470 0.282 
 
(-5.493) (-0.986) (0.168) 
Control Variables for Bank Specific 
Items  
   Log of Assets  0.234 -0.497 -0.043 
 
(0.461) (-1.030) (-0.024) 
Liquid Assets/Assets 0.434*** -0.001 -0.345 
 
(8.034) (-0.003) (-1.488) 
CAR 3.120*** -0.816** 2.479 
 
(11.010) (-2.236) (1.629) 
Income/Assets 17.738*** -3.632** -14.897*** 
 
(13.111) (-2.237) (-2.615) 
Deposit Inflows  -15.465 -36.506 -37.112 
 
(-0.759) (-0.937) (-0.307) 
Loan Commitments*Deposit Inflows  0.468 0.361 -3.073 
 
(0.846) (0.365) (-1.061) 
Observations  296 295 258 
No. Of Banks 27 27 21 
R-squared  0.887 0.513 0.766 
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Table A2 (Previous Page) Notes: In Panel 1, the dependent variable is the Z-score as bank risk indicator. In 
Panel 2, the dependent variable is the Stock Returns Volatility as bank risk indicator. In Panel 3, the 
dependent variable is the CDS Spreads as bank risk indicator. Note that higher Stock Returns Volatility as 
well as CDS Spreads mean more risk. Thus, the expected signs of our key variables are the inverse of what 
we expected with the Z-score as risk indicator. As proxy for the overall economic situation, we use the 
returns on the FTSE EuroTop Index. To measure the extent of market liquidity, we take the CP vs Gbond 
Spread which is the spread between the EU Midterm Bond Rate and the 5Y German Government Bond 
Rate. 1-Year Swap Rate which represents market interest rates is the 1-year Euro Interest Rate Swaps. All 
data for the market control variables are taken from Datastream. Items in parenthesis report the t-
statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level.  All 
regressions include an intercept.  
 Chapter 3. Credit Risk Management through 
Securitization: Effect on Loan  
Portfolio Choice 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study how banks take advantage of securitization as a credit risk 
management tool. In theory, banks may handle their credit risk exposures by 
using securitization to unload risky loans from their balance sheets. Using data 
on 129 FDIC-member banks, we have found that while banks indeed use 
securitization to manage their credit risk exposures, they do not necessarily do so 
by totally isolating themselves from risk. Instead, they exploit the credit risk 
management property of securitization to take on greater risk, in pursuit of high 
returns. As banks carry out this strategy, the banks’ loan portfolios are 
complimentarily diversified, giving banks diversification benefits. These benefits 
serve as windfall, which, in turn, tempers the banks’ concerns on the higher risks 
that they have taken. 
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I. Introduction 
Bank engagement in securitization lies on two rationales. One is that 
securitization provides the bank with an additional funding source and the other 
is that it can be a risk management tool. The former point is explained by the 
transformation of otherwise illiquid loans to liquid assets, where these loans are 
securitized and used to borrow funds through a Special Purpose Entity (SPE). By 
this mechanism, securitization helps banks with their funding matters. In 
Karaoglu (2005) and Martin-Oliver & Saurina (2007), for example, it has been 
observed that banks with deposit levels that are too low relative to the size of 
their loan portfolios tend to securitize their loans, in an effort to address the said 
issue. On the other hand, Loustkina (2011) has found that banks with loan 
portfolios that are more “securitizable”1, hold less liquid assets2 because the 
additional funding from securitization makes the holding of such costly liquidity 
buffers less necessary.  
Alternatively, the risk management role of securitization comes in two forms. 
First, which is related to its funding provision, is that securitization can serve as a 
hedge against liquidity problems.  In Loutskina (2011), this was pointed out in 
terms of banks having more securitizable loans in their balance sheets, as being 
able to continue and grant more loans even during funding shocks. Meanwhile, 
in Cabiles (2011), we have shown that banks engaging much in securitization can 
take on more loan commitments, whose unpredictable takedowns may pose 
illiquidity risk to banks.  
The other risk management role of securitization comes in providing banks 
with a means to handle their credit risk exposures. When the loans are 
securitized and transferred to the SPE, the loans leave the bank balance sheet. 
This results to the banks being isolated from the risk of the loans that they have 
securitized. Many studies have shown that banks attempt to take advantage of 
this credit risk management property of securitization. For example, Minton, 
Sanders & Strahan (2004), Pais (2005), Bannier & Hänsel (2007), Affinito & 
Tagliaferri (2010) and Panetta & Pozzolo (2010), have all shown that banks with 
more risky assets tend to securitize more. However, what may have been missed 
in these studies is an examination of what happens as the banks securitize. That 
                                                 
1
 Loutskina (2011) measures loan portfolio securitizability as the size of the bank’s loan portfolio 
multiplied by the depth of the securitization market of the bank’s home economy.   
2
 Liquid Assets is defined in Loutskina (2011) as marketable securities plus Federal Funds Sold (i.e. Reverse 
Repurchase Agreements).  
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is, these studies have shown that banks securitize, so that they might take some 
loans out of their balance sheets and tone down their credit risk exposures. But, 
these studies have not shown if the removal of loans through securitization has 
indeed made banks get rid of risk and has, therefore, reduced the credit risk that 
they respectively face. In this paper, we intend to provide the continuation of this 
discussion, where we attempt to look at how the loan portfolios of banks change, 
in terms of size and composition, with securitization. Moreover, we also 
investigate what such change (if any) implies on the risks and returns that the 
banks eventually face.  
Using data on 129 member banks of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company 
(FDIC), we initially look at how securitization may affect the size of the bank’s 
loan portfolio. We observe that banks that securitize more (i.e. banks with 
medium to high levels of securitization activity) have relatively bigger loan 
portfolio size, than those that securitize less. While these findings may be due to 
the additional funding provided by securitization3, such explanation may not be 
enough.  Having more funds (through securitization) does help in increasing a 
bank’s loan portfolio, but matters on risk exposures also come at play. Thus, we 
argue that the increase in the loan portfolio size that come with securitization 
could as well be driven by securitization giving banks a means of getting rid of 
risk, that makes the banks more flexible in granting and holding loans. In this 
sense, we may then consider that the credit risk management property of 
securitization can increase the banks’ loan portfolio size.  
Subsequently, we look at the composition of the banks’ respective loan 
portfolios, alongside their securitization activities. We view loan portfolio 
composition in terms of the share of the different loans classes on the banks’ 
balance sheet. We consider five loans classes namely, Real Estate, Commercial & 
Industrial (C&I), Consumer, Farm and Others4.  A clear observation we make is 
that the portfolio share of Consumer Loans is bigger (smaller) for the banks with 
high (low) securitization activity, while that of Real Estate Loans is smaller 
(bigger) among banks that securitize much (less). This suggests that the portfolio 
share of Consumer Loans increases with securitization activity, while that of Real 
Estate Loans decreases.  In addition, given that Real Estate Loans are the most 
securitized loans by banks while Consumer Loans are securitized much less, we 
                                                 
3
 As pointed out by numerous studies such as Cantor & Demsetz (1993), Altunbas, Gambacorta & 
Marquez-Ibanez (2007), Loutskina & Strahan (2008) and Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011).  
4
 The loans class “Others” refers to Acceptances and Receivables discounted by banks.  
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also get the impression that banks may have increased their holdings of 
Consumer Loans, through the securitization of their Real Estate Loans.  
 We attribute the above occurrence to the high risks of Consumer Loans and 
Real Estate Loans and to the high positive covariance of risk between the said 
loans classes. Looking at the default rates of the different loans classes, we 
observe that Consumer Loans and Real Estate Loans have the highest default 
rates, with the former having higher default rates than the latter. This makes the 
two said loans classes the riskiest loans that banks can hold. At the same time, we 
also observe that Consumer Loans and Real Estate Loans have the highest 
positive covariance of defaults. This means that holding both Consumer Loans 
and Real Estate Loans simultaneously may be too risky, which requires the banks 
to unload one class of loans when they hold on to the other. Since Consumer 
Loans are more monitoring intensive than Real Estate Loans5, banks may have 
opted to hold on to Consumer Loans, where holding and closely monitoring this 
loans class could realize its high potential interest income (that comes with its 
observed high risk6). At the same time, the banks may have also unloaded Real 
Estate Loans (while holding Consumer Loans) because Real Estate Loans are 
easier to securitize, owing to the collateralization of this loans class7.  
With these observations and its accompanying explanations, we may then 
consider the idea that banks may have increased their loan portfolios towards 
more Consumer Loans, by taking some Real Estate Loans out of their balance 
sheet through securitization, which consequently gives them more space to take 
on the risky but high-yielding Consumer Loans.  This implies that the banks’ 
employment of the credit risk management property of securitization may be in 
the direction of being exposed to greater risk, while pursuing high returns.  
                                                 
5
 Consumer Loans are monitoring intensive because these loans are uncollateralized loans to individuals, 
where the failure of such a loan gives zero pay-off to the bank (i.e. the bank must monitor the Consumer 
Loans to almost surely avoid losses). On the other hand, Real Estate Loans are collateralized loans for 
residential home purchases, where the failure of such a loan can still pay-off the bank through its seizure 
of the collateral (i.e. the bank does not need to strongly monitor a Real Estate Loan because, should (at 
worst) the loan fails, the bank can still receive a pay-off by taking the collateral).  
6
 As the risk-reward principle posits.  
7
 The ease of securitizing a loan may depend on the appeal of such loan to serve as the underlying asset 
which backs the debt issued in the securitization transaction. This appeal, in turn, rests on the value of the 
loan itself. A collateralized loan’s value is derived from the likelihood that it successfully pays-off and from 
its collateral. Meanwhile, an uncollateralized loan’s value is derived solely from the said probability of a 
successful pay-off. A loan that is collateralized may then be of higher value, as opposed to an 
uncollateralized one, and is then also of higher appeal as an underlying asset in a securitization 
transaction. It thus follows that a collateralized loan, such as a Real Estate Loan, is easy or easier to 
securitize (relative to an uncollateralized loan such as a Consumer Loan).   
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To test our inference, we implement a series of empirical estimations. First, 
we look at the relationship between securitization and loan portfolio size, to 
verify our initial observation that banks may have engaged in securitization, so 
that they can enlarge their loan portfolios. Employing the data on our 129 FDIC 
member banks, we find such confirmation through a positive relationship 
between securitization and total loans holdings. Next, we check if this increase in 
the loan portfolio, through securitization, is indeed geared towards holding 
Consumer Loans.  Our results show that securitization is positively related to the 
portfolio share of Consumer Loans, establishing the above point. In our 
following empirical analysis, we seek to prove that banks have used 
securitization to be able to take on higher risk, embodied in the increased 
holding of Consumer Loans above. Using loan defaults as indicators of loan 
portfolio risk, we find that securitization has a positive effect on the overall loan 
portfolio risk of our sample banks. This implies that banks may have exposed 
themselves to higher risk as they securitize, contrary to risk-unloading that has 
been expected of securitization (in principle). Lastly to see if the banks have done 
so to get higher returns, we take the banks’ Return on Assets (ROA) and Return 
on Equity (ROE) and estimate them against securitization activity. With 
securitization being positively related to both the ROA and the ROE, we come to 
the conclusion that banks have certainly made use of the credit risk management 
property of securitization to engage in greater risk, so that they may reap high 
returns.   
However, we also find that the above returns achieved through 
securitization, though high, are volatile. We draw this after observing a positive 
effect by securitization on the volatilities of the ROA and that of the ROE.   The 
implication of this finding is that although the high risk-taking may be 
accompanied by high returns, the instability of such returns may pose a concern 
to the banks. This concern could sequentially compromise the banks’ interest in 
continuing to engage in securitization. In such a situation, a certain windfall that 
would convince the banks to sustain their securitization activities may be 
necessary. We find this windfall as we look into the diversification effects of 
securitization. 
With our earlier finding that securitization can lead to the increase in the 
portfolio share of Consumer Loans, we consider that with securitization, the 
diversification of the banks’ respective loan portfolios may have also changed.  
Using a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as an indicator for loan 
portfolio diversification, we find that securitization activity is positively related 
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to loan portfolio diversification or that securitization can make the banks’ 
respective loan portfolios more diversified. Further analysing this point leads us 
to find that the alteration of the loan portfolio composition towards 
diversification, may also allow banks to enjoy the beneficial effects of 
diversification, namely reduced overall loan portfolio risk and lower returns 
volatility. Through these positive side-effects, the concerns on increased risk and 
unstable returns found earlier could be offset. As such, the banks may be 
motivated to continue and conveniently take on greater risk through 
securitization, and enjoy the accompanying high returns.  
Our study makes a number of contributions to the literature on securitization.  
First, our work builds up on earlier studies that view securitization as a means 
for banks to increase their loan-taking activities.  Our study goes further on this 
point by showing that securitization may not only increase the size of the bank’s 
loan portfolios, but may also change the composition of the loan portfolio 
towards more risky loans and diversification. Second and more importantly, our 
study adds to the literature on securitization as a risk management tool, where it 
shows that securitization may not necessarily be used for absolute risk isolation 
or reduction. Instead, our study points out that securitization is a risk 
management tool in the sense that it can be used by banks to take on more credit 
risk in pursuit of high yields, while also reaping the benefits of loan portfolio 
diversification. Lastly, our study also contributes to the ongoing discussions on 
the value of securitization. Following its involvement in the recent financial 
crisis, securitization has had an unfavourable reputation. By showing that 
securitization has risk-taking, profit-augmenting and diversification effects, our 
study points out that securitization may still have some significance.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows; Section II provides a short 
background on the credit risk management property of securitization and our 
preliminary data analysis. Section III provides a discussion of the literature 
related to our study. Section IV presents our empirical analyses in two parts. 
Section V gives some further analyses involving securitization and loan portfolio 
diversification. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Background and Preliminary Analysis  
Among the properties of securitization that motivate banks to engage in such 
activity is its provision of a means to manage credit risk. When a bank 
securitizes, it transfers the pool of loans to be securitized to an SPE. This 
movement takes the loans out of the bank balance sheet, which effectively 
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isolates the bank from the risk on these loans. Minton, et. al. (2004), Pais (2005), 
Bannier & Hänsel (2007), Affinito & Tagliaferri (2010) and Panetta & Pozzolo 
(2010) have all demonstrated that the banks that securitize more are those with 
more risky assets. These studies imply that banks may have actually taken 
advantage of this credit risk management property of securitization.  
However, what these past discussions may have left off is an investigation on 
the changes that the banks experience, as they securitize. While the studies 
mentioned above may have argued the point that banks securitize with the goal 
of isolating themselves from risky loans, the studies have not, for example, 
shown if banks do indeed have less risky loan portfolios as they securitize. We 
fill in this gap by looking at the effects of securitization on the banks’ loan 
portfolio in terms of size and composition, as well as, on the resulting risk and 
returns profiles of the banks.  
To go about our analyses, we first look at the securitization and loan portfolio 
data of the Top 12989 member banks of the FDIC from 2001-201010. We begin by 
taking the average securitization activity11 of each our sample banks for our 
entire sample period. Using the average securitization activity of each bank, we 
rank our banks from the highest securitization activity to the lowest. This 
ranking allows us to cut our sample banks into three groups, where banks above 
the 67th percentile of the ranking are considered as the banks that engage much 
in securitization (i.e. High-Securitizers), those between the 67th and 33rd 
percentile of the ranking are taken as the medium securitizing banks (i.e. Mid-
Securitizers) and, the banks at the bottom 33rd percentile of the ranking are 
treated as the banks that securitize the least (i.e. Low-Securitizers). With this 
grouping of our sample banks, we can take the average attributes of their loan 
portfolios (by group). This gives us a bird’s eye-view of the relationship between 
securitization activity and the banks’ loan portfolio, which we report in Table 1.  
We can find in Table 1, that securitization may lead to a larger loan portfolio. 
Looking at the Total Loans to Assets ratio, we find that the High and the Mid-
Securitizers have bigger loan portfolios than the Low-Securitizers. On the one 
hand, banks that securitize much may be able to have more loans because 
                                                 
8
 In Terms of Assets. 
9
 We started with the Top 150 FDIC Member banks but due to mergers and closures within our sample 
period, as well as, missing reports, our number of sample banks gets trimmed to 129.   
10
We begin at 2001:4 since this is the period when the FDIC member banks have started reporting their 
Securitization Activities.    
11
 We measure the Securitization Activity of our sample banks through its reported Bank Assets Sold & 
Securitized normalized to Total Assets.    
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securitization provides them with the funds that they need to do so12. However, 
we must take into account that the holding of loans is not just about having the 
funds to loan out, but also the tolerance or the space to bear the risk posed by the 
loans. As such, the larger loan portfolios among the heavy securitizing banks 
could also be an effect of the credit risk management property of securitization. 
That is, since securitization provides the banks with a vent for loans that they 
may eventually deem too risky, banks that are much engaged to securitization 
may be more accommodating or flexible in giving loans. Hence, securitization 
may increase the loan portfolio size of the banks.  
Considering this increase in the loan portfolio associated with securitization, 
we look at next how securitization may also change the composition of the loan 
portfolio. We view the composition of the loan portfolio in terms of the different 
loans classes that the banks hold. We consider five loans classes namely, Real 
Estate, C&I, Consumer, Farm and Others13. To able to see the effect of 
securitization on the composition of the loan portfolio, we take the portfolio 
shares of each loans class among our sample banks. We report the average of 
these portfolio shares per bank group in Table 1. From Table 1, the clear 
observations we can make are that the portfolio share of Consumer Loans (i.e. 
Consumer Loans/Total Loans) increases monotonically with securitization, 
while that of Real Estate Loans decreases monotonically with securitization. 
Given this we find that securitization seems to be associated with more holdings 
of Consumer Loans (relative to other loans classes) as well as lesser holdings of 
Real Estate Loans (relative to other loans classes).   
With these opposing trends between the holdings of Consumers Loans and 
that of Real Estate Loans in relation to securitization, we entertain the possibility 
that banks may have increased their Consumer Loans holdings through the 
securitization of Real Estate Loans. We get support for this idea in Figure 1, 
where we find that Real Estate Loans are the loans that have been primarily 
securitized by banks, and that banks have been securitizing Consumer Loans 
less. Figure 1 presents the quarterly share of securitized loans to total loans 
outstanding of each loans class from 2001-2010. We can see in Figure 1 that, 
throughout the period we consider, banks have been predominantly securitizing 
Real Estate Loans, while Consumer Loans have not been securitized as much by 
banks. In fact, towards the time when securitization has been a popular activity 
among banks (i.e. 2006), we see in Figure 1 that the securitization of Real Estate 
                                                 
12
 See Note 3. 
13
 See Note 4. 
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Loans have had some increase while that of Consumer Loans have remained flat. 
In addition, we also find in Figure 1 that even when securitization has fallen out 
of favour at about 2009 (due to its involvement with the subprime crisis), Real 
Estate Loans is still the leading loans class that is being securitized.   
We attribute this likely scheme of securitizing Real Estate Loans to hold 
Consumer Loans to the high risks of these two loans classes and to the high 
positive covariance of risk between these two loans classes. In Figure 2, we plot 
the default rates of our different loans classes. We can observe in Figure 2 that 
Consumer Loans have the highest default rates among the different loans classes, 
followed by Real Estate Loans14. This means that the said two loans classes may 
be the riskiest loans that the banks can hold. Meanwhile, in Table 2, we report the 
covariances of the default rates of our different loans classes. We can see that the 
pair of loans classes with the highest positive covariance of risk is that of 
Consumer Loans and Real Estate Loans. Combining these two observations 
imply that simultaneously holding Consumer Loans and Real Estate Loans may 
be too risky for banks. That is, since Consumer Loans and Real Estate Loans are 
the riskiest loans classes that banks can hold, and that these two loans classes 
have a very high positive risk covariance, holding much of the two of them at 
one time, may exhaust a bank’s tolerance for risk (i.e. risk limits). Thus, it may be 
then be necessary for the bank to unload one loans class (i.e. the Real Estate 
Loans), when holding the other loans class (i.e. the Consumer Loans). 
Considering that Consumer Loans are loans to individuals that have no 
collateral, Consumer Loans require more monitoring, where doing so can realize 
its high potential returns (associated with its high risk)15. As such, banks may 
have chosen to hold more Consumer Loans, as opposed to Real Estate Loans.  In 
addition, banks may have also securitized Real Estate Loans (as they hold 
Consumer Loans) because the collateralization of Real Estate Loans, makes it 
easier for this loans class to be securitized, than the uncollateralized Consumer 
Loans (and even the other loans classes). The ease of securitizing a loan may 
depend on the value of such loan to serve as the underlying asset that backs the 
debt in a securitization transaction. Real Estate Loans, by being collateralized, 
                                                 
14
 We note that we can see in Figure 2 that the default rates of Real Estate Loans may have caught up with 
that of Consumer Loans in 2008:2. However, we must consider that this period may have been triggered 
by an exogenous shock, namely the bursting of the US Housing Market Bubble.  Following the US Housing 
Market Collapse, we can see in Figure 2 that Consumer Loans still have relatively higher default rates than 
Real Estate Loans.  
15
 See Notes 5 & 6. 
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surpass Consumer Loans and other loans classes in such qualification, because 
the collateral of Real Estate Loans pushes up that value16.    
From our above discussion, we may construe that securitization must have 
been used by banks, not necessarily to totally isolate themselves from risk (as the 
theory may expect). Rather, what we have is that banks may have taken 
advantage of the credit risk management property of securitization, by using it as 
a means to gain the flexibility to take on higher risk and consequently enjoy the 
high returns promised by such risk increase. To put this in terms of our 
observations above, through the securitization of Real Estate Loans (which takes 
these loans out of the balance sheet), banks have managed to gain some space to 
increase their loan portfolios towards Consumer Loans. As we find, Consumer 
Loans is the riskiest loans class that banks can hold implying that the banks’ 
taking in of Consumer Loans through securitization, is an increase in risk taking.  
Moreover, as we point out, banks have held on to more Consumer Loans to be 
able to monitor them intensively and realize the high potential returns that their 
high risk promises.  Given this, the banks’ expansion of its loan portfolio towards 
risky Consumer Loans through securitization, may be in the pursuit of high 
returns.     
To confirm our hypothesis we employ our data on the 129 member banks of 
the FDIC in a series of estimations. First, we test if securitization does have a 
positive relationship with loan portfolio size, to verify our point that 
securitization has been used by banks to gain more flexibility in taking on loans. 
Next, we look at the relationship between securitization and the portfolio share 
of Consumer Loans, to see if the increase in the loan portfolio of the banks has 
indeed been towards Consumer Loans. Following this, we investigate if 
securitization is positively related to the overall loan portfolio risk of the bank, 
which will establish that banks have changed their loan portfolios through 
securitization, in the direction of taking on higher risk. Lastly, we examine if 
securitization is also positively related to the returns of the bank, to see if the 
above move of increasing risk exposures has been motivated by the interest of 
getting high returns17. However, before we proceed to these analyses we briefly 
discuss the literature related to our study.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 See Note 7.  
17
 Which may be achieved with the complimentary increased monitoring of the risky exposures  
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III. Related Literature 
 
Our study is primarily related to Cebenoyan & Strahan (2004) that looks into 
bank engagement in loan sales, which is an analogue to securitization18. In 
Cebenoyan & Strahan (2004), it has been observed that banks that actively sell 
their loans can increase their risky loans holdings in the form of Commercial Real 
Estate loans and C&I loans. In other words, the study has found that loans sales 
have an effect on the bank’s loan portfolio, where such portfolio gets to admit 
more risky loans. Following this change in the loan portfolio, the study 
investigates if the bank’s risk and returns may have been affected.  The study’s 
results show that the volatility of loan defaults are not statistically correlated 
with loan sales, implying that the increase in risky loan holdings stemming from 
loan sales does not necessarily translate to a higher overall risk profile for the 
bank. At the same time, the study has observed that loan sales are also not 
statistically related to the ROA and ROE of the banks, but are instead negatively 
related to the volatility of the ROA and that of the ROE.  These suggest that risky 
loan holdings brought about by loan sales may not also compromise the bank’s 
returns and that it may even make the banks’ returns more stable.  The 
conclusion that may be drawn from the study is thus, that loan sales serve as a 
risk management tool for the bank, wherein it allows the bank to take on higher 
risk without exacerbating the bank’s overall risk profile and, at the same time, 
gives the bank the benefit of more stable returns.   
On studies that focus on securitization, our study is related to Goderis, 
Marsh, Costello & Wagner (2007), Dione & Harchaoui (2003) and Loutskina 
(2011). In Goderis et. al. (2007), it has been found that securitization by means of 
issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) allows banks to relieve 
themselves of risk constraints, such that they can increase their targeted level of 
loans and increase their interest income from such bigger loan portfolio.  Dione 
& Harchaoui (2003), on the other hand, has pointed out that increasing levels of 
securitization tend to increase the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio among 
Canadian banks, implying that securitization permits banks to expand to risky 
                                                 
18
 Like securitization, the loans are sold to third parties under loans sales and, hence, leave the bank 
balance sheet, isolating the bank from the risk of these loans. The difference (among others) in the case of 
loan sales is that, the loans are sold directly to investors, which makes the investors’ risk exposures 
contingent on the loans that they have respectively bought. On the other hand, in the case of 
securitization, the loans are sold to the SPE, which in turn, issues debt backed the loans it has purchased 
to the investors. In effect, the risk exposures of the investors, in securitization, rely on the pool of loans 
that backs the SPE-issued debt. Notwithstanding this difference, however, loan sales and securitization 
are, as mentioned, similar in terms of the risk management property that they provide to banks. 
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loans. Likewise, Loutskina (2011) has shown that banks with more securitizable 
loan portfolios can continue to lend to the C&I Sector, and even increase this 
lending during periods of funding shocks. The said study points out that C&I 
loans may be the riskiest and least liquid types of loans that banks can grant.  
In addition, our study is also connected with Pavel & Phillis (1987) and 
Panetta & Pozzolo (2010), through our later discussion on the diversification 
effect of securitization. In Pavel & Phillis (1987), it has been found that banks 
participate in loan sales to have more diversified loan portfolios. The said study 
has shown that banks that are less diversified are more likely to sell their loans 
and that the banks that have done so attain more diversified loan portfolios (as 
opposed, to those that have not engaged in loan sales). On the other hand, 
Panetta & Pozzolo (2010) has found that banks that securitize tend to end up 
with more diverse loan portfolios. Specifically, the study has observed, that 
banks that have securitized, have loan portfolio compositions that are more 
equally distributed among mortgages, leases and other loans.   
IV. Empirical Analyses 
 
We divide our empirical analyses into two parts. The first part deals with the 
banks’ usage of securitization to make changes in their loan portfolios, in terms 
of size and composition. For the second part of our analysis, we examine if such 
changes made by banks through securitization are in the interest of taking in 
greater risk, to reap high gains.  
To review, we implement our empirical analysis using our data on the 129 
member banks of the FDIC from 2001-2010. The balance sheet data of our sample 
banks are found in their submitted Call Reports that are accessible at the FDIC 
website. The Call Reports are available on a quarterly basis.  
For all our estimations, we measure securitization activity by taking the sum 
of Bank Assets Sold and Securitized reflected in our banks’ Call Reports. We 
normalize this figure to Total Assets. This variable for securitization activity, 
which we shall note as Securitization, will be our main variable of interest in our 
empirical analyses.      
 
A. Securitization and the Bank Loan Portfolio 
i. Loan Portfolio Size  
We begin our empirical analysis with the test on the banks’ usage of 
securitization to gain more flexibility in holding more loans. We do this by 
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looking at the relationship between securitization and loan portfolio size. Our 
specification is as follows: 
 
itititoit XtionSecuritizaY εβαα +++= −− 111            (1) 
Where: itY = Total Loans Holdings or Loan Portfolio Size of bank i at the end of 
quarter t; 1−ittionSecuritiza = securitization activity of bank i at the beginning of 
quarter t; and 1−itX = vector of bank-specific control variables of bank i at the 
beginning of quarter t. 
To measure Loan Portfolio Size, we take the reported Total Loans and 
normalize it to Total Assets (Total Loans/Assets). We expect that Securitization 
should be positively related to Total Loans/Assets (i.e. 01 >α ). As we have 
argued securitization creates a vent for the banks to rid themselves of risk. With 
this facility, a bank may then be more accommodating in granting and holding 
loans, which leads to an increase in its loan portfolio size.  
To account for the other factors that may have an influence on the banks’ 
loans holdings (besides securitization), we add bank-specific control variables in 
our specification. The bank-specific factors we consider are Bank Size (measured 
through the Log of Assets), Capitalization (measured through the Capital-to-
Assets Ratio) and the size of the bank’s Traditional Funding Base (measured 
through Core Deposits/Assets). We also take into account if the bank operates 
within only one state or region (Local Bank Dummy) and if the bank is affiliated 
to a foreign bank holding company (Foreign Bank Dummy), as these 
characteristics may also have an influence on the size of the bank’s loan 
portfolio19.  
The summary statistics of the control variables involved in our estimations 
are also reported in Table 1. We can observe from our summary statistics that 
banks that securitize more, are bigger and better-capitalized. These bank 
characteristics may lend support to the banks, as they hold more loans through 
securitization. We also observe that banks that securitize more are less 
dependent on traditional funding.  As we move from the Low-Securitizers group 
to the High-Securitizers group, we observe that Core Deposits/Assets is 
                                                 
19
 Local banks may have less market coverage than national banks and thus may have smaller loan 
portfolios. Foreign banks, on the other hand, due to their reputation and larger market coverage, may 
have larger loan portfolios.   
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decreasing. This could be due to the other property of securitization, which is 
that of being a funding facility20.  
In implementing our specification, we employ bank fixed effects (FE) and 
panel instrumental variables (IV) regressions. In our IV regressions, we use as 
instruments the previous period’s21 Securitization Activity, Bank Size, 
Capitalization and Traditional Funding Base. Moreover, we also use as 
instruments a measure for the extent of Credit Enhancements22 that a bank offers 
on its securitization transactions, as well as, a measure for riskiness of the loans 
that the banks have securitized23.  The previous period’s Securitization Activity, 
Credit Enhancements and riskiness of securitized loans affects our dependent 
variable (i.e. loan portfolio size), only through our main explanatory variable24 
(i.e. the beginning of the quarter’s Securitization Activity ( 1−ittionSecuritiza )). 
Maintenance of our results in the FE estimations under our IV estimations, will 
then rule out the issue of reverse causality between securitization and loan 
portfolio size.  
In addition to using the two above estimation processes, we also execute our 
specification under three different periods. The first period we consider 
                                                 
20
 See Karaoglu (2005), Martin-Oliver & Saurina (2008) and Loutskina (2011) for studies on the funding 
property of securitization.  
21
 Given that we use a one-period lag on our independent variables, these instruments mentioned will 
then take a two-period lag.   
22
 Credit Enhancements are special features that banks may offer on their securitization transactions to 
make their deals more attractive. For a comprehensive discussion on Credit Enhancements and its various 
types, see Lea (2006). In this study, the Credit Enhancements that we consider are Subordinated 
Securitization and Lines of Credit. We measure the extent by which our sample banks offer these features 
by taking the ratio of the Amount of Credit Enhancements to the Total Amount of Securitized Loans (i.e. 
Total Amount of Subordinated Securitization Retained by the Bank/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized, 
Lines of Credit on Securitized Loans/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized). Data on Credit Enhancements 
are reported in the FDIC Call Reports.      
23
 We measure the riskiness of our sample banks’ securitized loans by taking the default rate of the banks’ 
securitized loans. We calculate the default rate as the ratio of the Amount of Securitized Loans in Default 
to the Total Amount of Securitized Loans (i.e. Total Amount of Securitized Loans in Default/Total Bank 
Assets Sold and Securitized).        
24
 The said instrumental variables have no direct effect on the observed loan portfolio size, but may only 
be related to it through Securitization Activity (which, as argued, may have a positive relationship on the 
loan portfolio size).  A bank that has had a large Securitization Activity for the previous period may be able 
to securitize more in the following periods, as its previous securitization activity could allow it to build a 
certain expertise and reputation in carrying out the transaction (Albertazzi, Eramo, Gambacorta & Salleo 
(2011)). Likewise, a bank that offers much Credit Enhancements on its securitization transactions may also 
be able to securitize more, because the Credit Enhancements serve as guarantees that the securitization 
transactions involve good quality underlying assets and that it will pay-off its investors, even if a default in 
the underlying assets happen (Thomas (1999), Gorton & Souleles (2005), Ashcraft & Schuermann (2007)) . 
Meanwhile, a bank with risky securitized loans may find its securitization activity limited, as its high 
incidence of defaulting securitized loans may signal that the underlying assets on its securitization 
transactions are of poor quality.   
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encompasses our entire sample period from 2001:4-2010:4. For the second period, 
we consider only 2001:4-2009:2 (which is the period when securitization has been 
popularly practiced by banks), while the third period concerns only 2009:3-2010:4 
(which is the period when banks have mainly shied away from securitization25).  
We differentiate between these periods to be able to establish if, even at the time 
when securitization has already been unpopular due to its entanglement with the 
subprime crisis, banks can still use it to be able to hold more loans.  
Our estimation results are reported in Panel 1 of Table 3 and in Panel 1 of 
Table 4.  Both the FE and IV estimation results are presented in Tables 3 & 4. In 
Table 3 the results concern the entire sample period of 2001:4-2010:4, while in 
Table 4 the results are differentiated according to when securitization was in 
favour (2001:4-2009:2) and when it has been less so (2009:3-2010:4).  We find in 
both FE and IV estimations in Panel 1 of Table 3 that Securitization is positively 
related to Loan Portfolio Size, as expected. Our results show that this effect of 
Securitization is, as well, statistically and economically significant. This finding 
establishes the point that banks may have used securitization to take in more 
loans. As we have pointed out, securitization gives the bank the option to unload 
loans, should they deem some loans too much to bear. Given this outlet, banks 
may then be more flexible in holding loans, which can inflate their portfolios. In 
Panel 1 of Table 4, we see that this point applies in both periods when 
securitization was popular and when it was otherwise. We find that in both 
differentiated periods, the FE and IV estimations still show a positive 
relationship between Securitization and Loan Portfolio Size    
On the control variables all our results in Panel 1 of Table 3 and Panel 1 of 
Table 4, show that Log of Assets is negatively related to Total Loans/Assets. 
Though this may be an unexpected result, this can be explained by big banks 
being more involved in other activities such as fee-based services (e.g. securities 
underwriting, loan syndication, etc.). Involvement in these other activities tends 
to compromise the bank’s interest-income driven activities, specifically, loans. 
Hence, the negative relationship observed between loan holdings and bank size. 
On the other hand, the Capital-to-Assets Ratio (CAR) has come out positively 
related to total loans holdings, also in all estimations reflected in Panel 1 of Table 
3 and Panel 1 of Table 4. This result is straightforward, as more capitalized banks 
are more capable of bearing loan exposures.  
                                                 
25
 This period may be observed in Figure 1 as the horizon where there has been a steep drop in the 
securitization of Real Estate Loans (as well as Consumer Loans) and that there has been no recovery since 
then on in the securitization of loans (irrespective of class).   
92 | C h a p t e r  3 :  C r e d i t  R i s k   
 
 
ii. Loan Portfolio Composition  
Having established that banks use securitization to expand their loan portfolios, 
we proceed to investigate if such, as we have earlier observed, is geared towards 
holding more Consumer Loans. To do this, we re-estimate Equation (1) with the 
portfolio share of Consumer Loans (Consumer Loans/Total Loans) as dependent 
variable. In our estimations, we implement the same estimation techniques and 
treatments in the sample period, as in our previous analysis between 
securitization and loan portfolio size. We expect that securitization should be 
positively related to Consumer Loans/Total Loans (i.e. 01 >α ).   
From our set of results in Panel 2 of Table 3, we find a confirmation of our 
above expectation. Securitization is positively related to Consumer Loans/Total 
Loans, with this effect being statistically and economically significant. At the 
same time, from our results in Panel 2 of Table 4, we observe that the positive 
relationship between Securitization and Consumer Loans/Total Loans holds in 
both periods when securitization was highly practiced and when it was not. 
Going through our control variables, the robust and economically significant 
relationships to Consumer Loans/Total Loans that we find are those on 
Capitalization and Core Deposits/Assets. We have in the results of both Panel 2 
of Table 3 and Panel 2 of Table 4 that Capitalization is positively related to 
Consumer Loans/Total Loans. This result reiterates the importance of capital 
adequacy in bearing loan exposures, especially risky loans such as Consumer 
Loans. Meanwhile, Core Deposits/Assets is negatively related to Consumer 
Loans/Total Loans in all our estimations. This implies that banks relying much 
on traditional funding may not grant and hold much Consumer Loans. This can 
be explained by the banks creating a mismatch on their assets and liabilities to 
manage cash flows, since both Core Deposits and Consumer Loans are retail in 
nature26.  
With our findings above, we have managed to prove the first two points of 
our hypothesis. These points are that banks have taken advantage of the credit 
risk management property of securitization to be able to increase their loan 
portfolios, and that this increase is geared towards Consumer Loans.  In the 
following analyses, we seek to confirm the remaining part of our hypothesis. 
                                                 
26
 Consumer Loans and Core Deposits are retail banking activities in the sense that banks transact such 
activities with individual clients. In a period when there is a high demand for cash among consumers, a 
surge in applications for Consumer Loans might happen alongside deposit withdrawals, creating a cash 
flow problem. Thus banks, may want to avoid engaging in both retail lending and borrowing activities 
simultaneously, or in other words, create a mismatch in their assets and liabilities.     
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This is that as the banks make the said changes in their loan portfolios using 
securitization, they expose themselves to higher risk and that this exposure to 
greater risk has been done to enjoy high returns (that an increase in risk-taking 
with intense monitoring promises).  
 
B. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Risk and Bank Returns  
i. Loan Portfolio Risk  
To check if banks may have exposed themselves to more risk through 
securitization, we look at the relationship between securitization and the overall 
risk of the bank’s loan portfolio. We take four indicators of loan portfolio risk 
namely; a. the Non-Performing Loans27 to Total Loans Ratio (NPLs/Total Loans); 
b. the standard deviation of NPLs/Total Loans28 (SD NPLs); c. the Loan Charge-
Offs29 to Total Loans Ratio (Charge-Offs/Total Loans); and d. the standard 
deviation of Charge-Offs/Total Loans30 (SD Charge-Offs).   
Given our measures for loan portfolio risk, we do panel estimations of the 
following equation:  
ititititoit ZXtionSecuritizaY εφβαα ++++= −−− 1111                        (2) 
Where: 
itY = Loan Portfolio Risk Indicator of bank i at the end of quarter t; 
1−ittionSecuritiza = securitization activity of bank i at the beginning of quarter t; 
1−itX = vector of bank-specific control variables of bank i at the beginning of 
quarter t; and 1−itZ = vector of shares of each loans class in the loan portfolio of 
bank i at the beginning of quarter t. 
For the bank-specific control variables, we include the same control variables 
for Bank Size and Capitalization plus a control variable for Loan Portfolio Size, 
measured by Total Loans normalized to Total Assets (Total Loans/Assets). We 
control for Loan Portfolio Size as this variable may have an influence on the 
incidence of loan defaults (which we use as indicators for loan portfolio risk). 
Like in our previous estimations we also take into account the geographical 
confinement of the bank’s operations (Local Bank Dummy) and its affiliation to a 
foreign bank holding company (Foreign Bank Dummy).  
                                                 
27
 Non-Performing Loans are defined as loans that have been past due for 90s days plus loans that have 
been in non-accrual status.  
28
 In calculating SD NPLs, we use NPLs of the four quarters of each year. As a result we experience a 
reduction in the number of observations when using this as indicator for loan portfolio risk.  The same 
case applies to SD Charge-Offs.  
29
 Loan charge-offs are defined as loans that have been delinquent for at least 120 days.  
30
 See Note 28. 
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At the same time, we also include variables controlling for the shares of each 
loans class in the banks’ respective loan portfolios (vector-Z). We include this set 
of control variables, considering that each loan class have varying risk and may 
therefore have different impacts on the incidence of loan defaults. To avoid 
perfect collinearity, we exclude the portfolio share of Other Loans (i.e. Other 
Loans/Total Loans). 
Going back to Table 1, we see in our summary statistics that our indicators of 
loan portfolio risk are generally higher for banks that securitize more (i.e. those 
in the Mid and High-Securitizers Group), than those that securitize less (i.e. those 
in the Low-Securitizers Group).   This gives us the impression that overall loan 
portfolio risk may increase with securitization. In Table 5, we get a verification of 
this notion where we find a positive relationship between Securitization and all 
our measures of loan portfolio risk. As reported in Table 5, securitization is 
statistically and economically significant in most of our estimations except that of 
SD Charge-Offs. These results affirm our point that banks have used 
securitization not necessarily to totally isolate themselves from risk, but rather to 
be able to bear greater risk.   
On the control variables, Banks Size, Capitalization and Loan Portfolio Size 
are chiefly positively related to loan portfolio risk. Bigger and more capitalized 
banks as well as banks with larger portfolios do tend to take on more risk. Hence, 
such variables are bound to be positively related with loan portfolio risk. 
Meanwhile, the respective portfolio shares of the different loans classes are also 
mostly positively related to all the measures of loan portfolio risk. This result is 
immediate, as every loans class must pose some risk to the loan portfolio of the 
bank. 
 
ii. Bank Returns 
Finding that banks may have securitized towards increasing their loan portfolio 
risk, we go to our other point, where this move may have been stirred by the 
banks wanting to realize the high potential returns of such risky loan exposures 
(with more intense monitoring). Should this be the case, then securitization 
activity must be associated with high returns for the banks. We measure bank 
returns in two dimensions namely the actual returns of the bank and the stability 
of these returns. Our measures for the actual bank returns are the ROA and the 
ROE, while for the stability of bank returns, our indicators are the respective 
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standard deviations of the ROA and ROE (SD ROA and SD ROE)31. The higher 
the SD ROA or the SD ROE, the less stable are the bank returns.  
Looking at the summary statistics of our variables for bank returns in Table 1, 
we find some evidence that the increase in risk taking through securitization may 
be accompanied by high bank returns. We observe that the ROA and the ROE for 
High-Securitizers are markedly higher than that of Mid-Securitizers and Low-
Securitizers. However, it also seems that these high returns may not necessarily 
be complemented with more stable bank returns, as the SD ROA and the SD ROE 
appear higher for the groups of banks that securitize more.  
To verify our observations, we estimate our variables for bank returns against 
the same independent variables we used in the estimations for loan portfolio risk 
(i.e. Equation 2). The results are presented in Table 6.  In Panels 1 & 2 of Table 6, 
we find that Securitization is positively related to both the ROA and ROE and is 
also statistically and economically significant in both estimations. These findings 
along with the earlier ones on loan portfolio risk, confirm our point that banks 
may have used securitization to take on higher risk and enjoy high returns. This 
is emphasized with the portfolio share of risky Consumer Loans being also 
positively related to the ROA, while the portfolio shares of the other loans classes 
have coefficients with negative signs. On the other control variables, we have 
that bank size and capitalization are negatively related to bank returns, pointing 
out that big and more capitalized banks are not necessarily the most profitable. 
This may be once again due to the tendency of most of these banks to go into 
other activities where these activities may not be very high-yielding (e.g. fee-
based services).  Loan portfolio size, on the other hand, is positively related to 
both ROA and ROE. These results are driven by the large interest income that is 
derived from a big loan portfolio.  
Meanwhile, Panels 3 & 4 show that securitization is positively related to the 
SD ROA and the SD ROE, or that securitization can lead to unstable bank 
returns. These results may be due to the risky source of the high returns 
provided by securitization, which is that of increasing the portfolio share of risky 
loans. The implication of these findings is that, although the banks’ increase in 
risk exposures through securitization may yield high gains, these gains may be 
unstable (owing to the high risk exposures itself). Given such, the reward of high 
                                                 
31
 Like in the case of SD NPLs and SD Charge-Offs, the SD ROA and the SD ROE are calculated using the 
ROA and the ROE of the four quarters of each year. As a result we experience a reduction in the number 
of observations for these particular estimations. 
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returns for higher risk may not be enough to convince the banks to sustain their 
engagement in securitization. Thus, some form of windfall might be necessary to 
persuade banks to continue to securitize and carry on with the strategy above. 
We find such windfall in the complementary diversification effect of 
securitization, which we discuss in the following section.    
 
V. Further Analyses 
 
A. Securitization and Loan Portfolio Diversification 
Our earlier finding which shows that securitization shuffles the composition of 
the bank’s loan portfolio towards more Consumer Loans, brings the possibility 
that securitization may also have an impact on the diversification of the bank’s 
loan portfolio. Given that diversification has implications on the risk of the 
bank’s loan portfolio, as well as its returns, we look into this issue. The classical 
hypothesis of diversification posits that by spreading a portfolio into different 
assets (or, in our case, loans) with uncorrelated risks, the risks may cancel each 
other out. As such, diversification may reduce the overall risk of the loan 
portfolio and that the risk-reduction could also lead to more stable returns. In 
Acharya, Hasan & Saunders (2002), this hypothesis has been partly verified by 
results that among Italian banks, the banks that diversify their loans on different 
sectors have lower NPLs.  
If we look back at our summary statistics in Table 1, we may observe that 
securitization, to some degree, could lead to a more diversified loan portfolio. As 
we move from the Low-Securitizers Group to the High-Securitizers Group, we 
see a relatively more even distribution in the portfolio shares of each loans class. 
For example, Low-Securitizers, on average, hold a large chunk of their loans in 
Real Estate Loans at 62%, followed by C&I Loans at 24% and only a small portion 
of Consumer Loans at 8%.  In contrast, High-Securitizers, have a relatively more 
balanced loan portfolio, where on average, the portfolio share of Real Estate 
Loans is at 45%, while that of the C&I Loans is at 17% and that of Consumer 
Loans is at 26%.  
To further investigate this point, we take an indicator for loan portfolio 
diversification given by the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
( HHI−1 )32. The intuition of this index is that the higher it is, the more diverse is 
the loan portfolio.  The average HHI−1 of our different bank groups are reported 
in Table 1. Both Mid-Securitizers and High-Securitizers have fairly higher 
                                                 
32
 Please see the Appendix for a discussion on the computation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
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average diversification indicators than the Low-Securitizers.  Given such, we 
move to confirm this observed case of securitization leading to loan portfolio 
diversification. To do so, we implement a panel estimation on itHHI−1 against 
securitization. In this estimation, we include the same control variables used in 
Equation (1). At the same time, we add a one-period lagged value of the same 
indicator for loan portfolio diversification ( 11 −− itHHI ). The purpose of adding 
11 −− itHHI  is to control for the likelihood that the bank may have already been 
diversifying previously (perhaps as a way to manage risk).   
Our estimation results reported in the first row of Table 733 shows that 
securitization may actually lead to loan portfolio diversification, with 
Securitization being positively related to HHI−1 . We note that Securitization is 
statistically and economically significant in relation to the loan portfolio 
diversification indicator, even while considering for the strong reinforcing effect 
of the previous extent of loan portfolio diversification ( 11 −− tHHI ).  
 
B. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Diversification, Risk and Returns  
Given the result above, we next examine if the bank reaps the known benefits of 
diversification, namely lower overall loan portfolio risk and more stable returns. 
In doing this, we estimate our measures of loan portfolio risk and our measures 
for bank returns volatility against our diversification indicator ( 11 −− itHHI )
34, 
while controlling for securitization activity. We also include the control variables 
we have used in the estimation of Equation (2), except for the portfolio shares of 
the different loans classes, as these shares may already be accounted for by the 
diversification indicator35. 
Looking at our results on the second to the seventh rows of Table 736, we find 
that the banks do enjoy the beneficial effects of diversification. In Panel 1, we can 
see that 
11 −− tHHI  is negatively related to our measures of loan portfolio risk, 
indicating that diversification lowers overall loan portfolio risk. At the same 
time, we can observe that the diversification indicator is negatively related to the 
SD ROA and the SD ROE, which means that diversification may stabilize bank 
                                                 
33
 For purposes of brevity, we report in Table 7 only the coefficients of our variables of interest namely 
Securitization and the one-period lag of the diversification index (1-HHIt-1). 
34
 The loan portfolio diversification indicator for this set of estimations takes a one-period lag, since we 
use beginning of quarter values for our independent variables, as in the earlier estimations.  
35
 This is because the calculation of the diversification index is based on the portfolio share of each loans 
class in the bank’s loan portfolio.   
36
 See Note 33.   
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returns. Meanwhile, in Panel 2 we see the same relationship we have found 
earlier between securitization and our variables for loan portfolio risk and bank 
returns stability. In the case of NPLs and SD NPLs, we see that the negative 
impact of 11 −− tHHI  is more economically significant than the positive impact of 
Securitization. These suggest that the diversification benefit of reduced overall 
loan portfolio risk, may effectively temper the increased risk brought about by 
securitization that results from the greater portfolio share of risky loans. 
Likewise, the negative effect of 11 −− tHHI on SD ROE is more economically 
significant than the positive effect of Securitization. This points out that the 
instability of returns from securitization may also be mitigated by the 
diversification benefit of stable returns. Given these, we can consider that the 
diversification benefits could offset the undesirable effects of securitization. As 
such, banks receive the needed windfall to continue to engage in securitization 
with the interest of taking on higher risk, in pursuit of high returns. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
Securitization provides banks with a means to isolate themselves from risky 
loans. A number of studies have shown that banks may take advantage of this 
credit risk management property of securitization, where banks with riskier 
assets tend to securitize more. We expound on this point by looking at what 
happens to the banks’ risk exposures as they securitize.   
We have observed that when securitizing, banks have larger loan portfolios 
and that this increase in loan portfolio size is geared towards having more risky 
assets. At the same time, we have found that these changes in the banks’ loan 
portfolios, through securitization, entail an increase in the overall risk of the 
bank’s loan portfolios as well as high returns. Given these, we construe that as 
banks securitize and use the credit risk management property of securitization, 
what occurs is not necessarily a total isolation from risk (as what theory may 
predict). Instead, what happens is a taking on of greater risk among the 
securitizing banks, to achieve high returns.   
A concern on the high returns from securitization, however, is that we have 
also found these to be unstable. This may due to the fact that the said returns are 
derived from the high exposure to risky loans. Nevertheless, this concern, as well 
as, the implications of having more risky assets is tempered through the benefits 
of having a more diversified loan portfolio, which comes as a side-effect of the 
engagement in securitization. As banks use securitization to increase their 
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exposure to risky assets, they also end up diversifying their loan portfolios that 
provide them the diversification benefits of reduced overall loan portfolio risk 
and more stable returns. With these diversification benefits offsetting the above 
issues, banks find the motivation to keep on securitizing to increase their risk 
exposures, and enjoy the accompanying high rewards for taking on risky assets.  
From our findings, we conclude that the credit risk management property of 
securitization goes beyond the mere offloading of credit risk, by taking loans out 
of the bank balance sheet. Rather, the credit risk management role of 
securitization goes all the way to the structure of the bank’s loan portfolio or the 
bank’s choice of assets, where this choice of assets is geared towards more risk-
taking, to achieve better returns.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Volume of Bank Assets Sold & Securitized/Assets  
(Securitization) 
Sampling Period: 2001:4-2010:4, 
No. Of Banks: 129, No. of Banks in 
Each Group: 43 
Low-Securitizers  
(Sec ≤ 33rd 
Percentile)  
Mid-Securitizers 
(33rd 
Percentile<Sec≤ 
67th Percentile) 
High-Securitizers 
(67th Percentile< 
Sec)  
  1 2 3 
Total Loans/Assets  59.929 64.019 64.126 
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans  62.434 57.585 45.991 
C&I Loans/Total Loans  23.668 20.940 17.047 
Consumer Loans/Total Loans 8.230 9.637 26.774 
Farm Loans/Total Loans 0.554 0.425 0.588 
Other Loans/Total Loans 5.185 11.441 9.633 
Log of Assets  16.338 16.674 17.522 
CAR  10.266 11.401 12.374 
Core Deposits/Assets 58.062 51.734 43.220 
1-HHI 0.433 0.454 0.453 
NPLs/Total Loans 1.310 2.106 2.025 
SD NPLs 0.290 0.523 0.369 
Charge-Offs/Total Loans 0.563 0.920 1.667 
SD Charge-Offs 0.168 0.218 0.205 
ROA 0.880 0.769 1.180 
SD ROA 0.200 0.425 0.394 
ROE 9.809 7.613 10.576 
SD ROE  2.039 3.830 3.692 
Balance sheet data are taken from the FDIC Quarterly Call Reports. 1-HHI is the inverse of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, serving as indicator for loan portfolio diversification. The standard 
deviations (SDs) are calculated for each year using quarterly values.   
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Figure 1. Share of Securitized Loans to Total Loans Outstanding by Loans 
Class (2001-2010) 
The share of Securitized Loans to Total Loans Outstanding of each Loans Class is calculated as the ratio of 
the Amount of Securitized Loans of each Loans Class to the Total Amount of Loans of each Loans Class 
(e.g. Share of Securitized Real Estate Loans = Amount of Real Estate Loans Securitized/Total Real Estate 
Loans Outstanding). Data used for the calculation of figures plotted above are taken from the Flow of 
Funds Account of the United States, Federal Reserve Board.  
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Figure 2. Default Rates by Loans Class (2001-2010) 
The default rate of each Loans Class is calculated as the ratio of the Amount of Loans of each Loans Class 
that is in Default to the Total Amount of Loans of Each Loan Class (e.g. Default Rate of the Real Estate 
Loans=Real Estate Loans in Default/Total Amount of Real Estate Loans). The default rates are calculated 
based on the aggregate values for the entire Commercial and Thrift Banking System under the FDIC. Data 
on aggregate values for the Commercial and Thrift Banking System are accessible through the Statistics on 
Depository Institutions available at the FDIC website. 
 
Table 2. Covariance Matrix of Defaults among Different Loans Classes (2001-
2010) 
  Farm C&I  Consumer Others  
Real Estate 0.1436186 0.0604956 0.1908590 0.0314621 
Farm 
 
0.0389255 0.0779504 0.0036428 
C&I  
  
0.0361855 0.0029371 
Consumer       0.0127283 
The covariances are calculated using the default rates in Figure 2. The 
range for the calculation of the covariances is based in the sample period 
of 2001:4-2010:4.  
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Table 3. Securitization and the Bank Loan Portfolio (Entire Period) 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Total Loans/Assetst  Consumer Loans/Loanst  
 
1 2 
Sampling Period: 2001:4-
2010:4 
FE  IV  FE IV 
Independent Variables  
    Securitizationt-1  0.081*** 0.086*** 0.428*** 0.475*** 
 
(8.706) (6.950) (32.356) (36.663) 
Log of Assetst-1 -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.001 0.001 
 
(-20.243) (-6.696) (-0.523) (0.015) 
CARt-1 0.476*** 0.628*** 0.354*** 0.805*** 
 
(13.961) (11.481) (12.870) (14.003) 
Core Deposits/Assetst-1 -0.001 0.019 -0.058*** -0.091*** 
 
(-0.071) (1.259) (-11.312) (-5.742) 
     Local Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3982 3982 3982 3982 
No. of Banks  129 129 129 129 
R-Squared  0.378 0.167 0.435 0.426 
The main independent variable for these estimations is Securitization measured as the Total Bank Assets 
Sold and Securitized normalized to Total Assets. The dependent variable in Panel 1 is Loan Portfolio Size 
measured as the ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets. The dependent variable in Panel 2 is the ratio of 
Consumer Loans to Total Loans. FE refers to the Bank Fixed Effects estimation results, while IV refers to 
the Panel Instrumental Variables estimation results. In the IV estimations, the instruments used are the 
previous period’s (i.e. two-period lag) Securitization, Log of Assets, CAR, Core Deposits/Assets, Total 
Amount of Subordinated Securitization Retained by the Bank/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized, Lines 
of Credit on Securitized Loans/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized, and Total Amount of Securitized 
Loans in Default/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized. Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an 
intercept.
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Table 4 (Previous Page) Notes: The main independent variable is Securitization measured as the Total 
Bank Assets Sold and Securitized normalized to Total Assets. The dependent variable in Panel 1 is Loan 
Portfolio Size measured as the ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets. The dependent variable in Panel 2 is 
the ratio of Consumer Loans to Total Loans. Estimations for the dependent variables are differentiated 
into two periods, namely 2001:4-2009:2 and 2009:3-2010:4. The period of 2001:4-2009:2 pertain to the 
period when securitization has been highly practiced by banks. On the other hand, the period 2009:3-
2010:4 refers to the period when banks have engaged less in securitization, as the activity has fallen out 
of favour due to its involvement with the subprime crisis. FE refers to the Bank Fixed Effects estimation 
results, while IV refers to the Panel Instrumental Variables estimation results. In the IV estimations, the 
instruments used are the previous period’s (i.e. two-period lag) Securitization, Log of Assets, CAR, Core 
Deposits/Assets, Total Amount of Subordinated Securitization Retained by the Bank/Total Bank Assets 
Sold and Securitized, Lines of Credit on Securitized Loans/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized, and 
Total Amount of Securitized Loans in Default/Total Bank Assets Sold and Securitized. Items in parenthesis 
report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. 
All regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 5. Securitization and Loan Portfolio Risk 
 
Dependent Variable 
  NPLst  Charge-Offst  SD  NPLst  
SD Charge-
Offst  
Sampling Period: 2001:4-2010:4 1 2 3 4 
Independent Variables  
    Securitizationt-1  0.786*** 0.917*** 0.141*** 0.023 
 
(10.624) (8.240) (4.003) (0.887) 
Log of Assetst-1 0.917*** 0.326*** 0.100*** 0.021*** 
 
(22.872) (17.296) (5.400) (2.709) 
CARt-1 1.670*** 0.366 0.723*** 0.092 
 
(5.409) (1.503) (4.746) (0.907) 
Loans/Assetst-1 1.045*** 0.882*** 0.108* 0.046 
 
(9.145) (12.561) (1.698) (1.503) 
Real Estate Loans/Loanst-1 1.276*** 0.224*** 0.145* 0.047 
 
(9.181) (3.025) (1.913) (1.293) 
C&I Loans/Loanst-1 1.099*** 0.745*** 0.156* 0.154*** 
 
(7.304) (7.165) (1.681) (3.428) 
Consumer Loans/Loanst-1 0.369** 2.579*** -0.135* 0.218*** 
 
(2.445) (20.083) (-1.648) (4.964) 
Farm Loans/Loanst-1 4.463*** -0.236 0.841 0.296 
 
(4.678) (-0.279) (1.609) (0.819) 
     Local Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3982 3982 971 971 
No. of Banks  129 129 129 129 
R-Squared  0.230 0.317 0.092 0.071 
The dependent variable in Panel 1 is Non-Performing Loans normalized to Total Loans. Non-Performing 
Loans are defined as loans that have been past due for 90 days plus loans that have been in non-
accrual status.  In Panel 2, the dependent variable is Charge-Offs normalized to Total Loans. Loans are 
Charged-Off if they are delinquent for the past 120 days.  The dependent variable in Panel 3 is the 
standard deviation (SD) of Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans, while in Panel 4, the dependent variable 
is the SD of Charge-Offs/Total Loans. The respective SDs are calculated for each year using quarterly 
values. Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 6. Securitization and Bank Returns 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
ROAt  ROEt  SD ROAt  SD ROEt  
Sampling Period: 2001:4-2010:4 1 2 3 4 
Independent Variables  
    Securitizationt-1  0.858*** 4.935*** 0.251*** 1.672*** 
 
(9.264) (6.208) (4.640) (4.371) 
Log of Assetst-1 -0.285*** -2.875*** -0.008 -0.031 
 
(-16.017) (-15.165) (-0.737) (-0.265) 
CARt-1 -1.177*** -67.438*** 0.098 -9.307*** 
 
(-4.581) (-30.092) (0.572) (-7.489) 
Loans/Assetst-1 0.346*** 5.053*** 0.236*** 0.649 
 
(4.514) (6.207) (4.843) (1.413) 
Real Estate Loans/Loanst-1 -0.817*** -11.627*** -0.357*** -2.589*** 
 
(-8.100) (-11.518) (-4.445) (-3.817) 
C&I Loans/Loanst-1 -0.148 -7.164*** -0.239** -3.570*** 
 
(-1.123) (-5.213) (-2.340) (-4.014) 
Consumer Loans/Loanst-1 0.371*** -0.901 -0.222** -1.381** 
 
(3.102) (-0.818) (-2.461) (-1.992) 
Farm Loans/Loanst-1 -2.211*** -18.823*** -0.792 -1.222 
 
(-3.316) (-2.877) (-1.533) (-0.444) 
     Local Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Bank Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3982 3982 971 971 
No. of Banks  129 129 129 129 
R-Squared  0.178 0.301 0.098 0.096 
The dependent variable in Panel 1 is the ROA, while in Panel 2, the dependent variable is the ROE. The 
standard deviations of the ROA and the ROE stand as dependent variables and measures of bank 
returns stability in Panels 3 and 4, respectively. The respective SDs are calculated for each year using 
quarterly values. Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
at the 5% level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Table 7. Securitization, Loan Portfolio Diversification, Risk and Returns 
 
Independent Variables 
No. of 
Obs. 
No. of 
Banks 
R-
Squared 
 
1-HHIt-1  Securitizationt-1  
Sampling Period: 2001:4-
2010:4 
1 2 
Dependent Variables  
     
1-HHIt 0.855*** 0.019*** 3982 129 0.976 
 
(107.307) (3.832) 
   NPLst  -0.782*** 0.286*** 3982 129 0.263 
 
(-4.098) (4.576) 
   Charge-Offst  -0.125** 1.730*** 3982 129 0.219 
 
(-2.465) (13.965) 
   SD NPLst  -0.094* -0.017 971 129 0.042 
 
(-2.428) (-0.502) 
   SD Charge-Offst  -0.051* 0.080*** 971 129 0.043 
 
(-1.787) (2.978) 
   SD ROAt -0.160*** 0.278*** 971 129 0.111 
 
(-4.786) (5.558) 
   SD ROEt -2.129*** 1.981*** 971 129 0.137 
 
(-5.254) (5.401) 
               
The dependent variables are on the first column (leftmost panel) of the Table. 1-HHI is the indicator of 
loan portfolio diversification, measured as the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirshcman Index (HHI). For 
brevity, only the main independent variables, 1-HHIt-1 (in Panel 1) and Securitizationt-1 (in Panel 2) are 
reported. Items in parenthesis report the t-statistics. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level and, ***at the 1% level. All regressions include an intercept. 
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Appendix: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The HHI is originally a measure of market dispersion (or concentration), 
calculated using the market shares of a set competing firms. However, the 
concept of the HHI has been also applied to create an indicator for loan portfolio 
diversification. Studies that have used the HHI as an indicator for loan portfolio 
diversification include Acharya, et. al. (2002), Stiroh (2004), Kamp, Pfingsten & 
Porath (2006) and Kamp, Pfingsten, Memmel & Behr (2007).  The HHI (as a loan 
portfolio diversification measure) is calculated as:  
∑
=
=
n
i
iB qHHI
1
2                   (1A) 
Where: 
BHHI is the HHI or loan portfolio diversification indicator of bank B, 
idenotes a particular loan segment in bank B’s portfolio, n is the number of 
segments in bank B’s loan portfolio, and 
∑
=
=
n
i
i
i
i
Q
Q
q
1
or the share of a certain loan 
segment i, in bank B’s loan portfolio.  
In our study, we have five loan segments, which are the five loans classes we 
consider, namely Real Estate Loans, C&I Loans, Consumer Loans, Farm Loans 
and Other Loans. The HHI takes a value between n/1  and 1, where a value equal 
to 1 means that the bank’s loans are of only one segment or that there is full 
concentration (i.e. no diversification). On the other hand, an HHI equal to n/1 , 
implies equal shares among the different loan segments in bank B’s portfolio or 
full diversification. For our analysis, it is more convenient to take and use the 
inverse of the HHI that is, HHI−1 . In this way, we have that a higher (lower) 
HHI−1 indicates a more diverse (concentrated) loan portfolio for the bank. 
